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[Editor’s Note: As this Article neared the completion of the editorial process, Con-
gress enacted the Inflation Adjusted Act Improvements Act of 2015, which imple-
ments most of the recommendations made herein. Among other changes, the timing 
of adjustments has changed, the 10% cap on inflation is now 150%, and the Office of 
Management and Budget now exercises central control over adjustments. In re-
sponse to these changes, Part IV.C has been added to detail the reforms contained 
in the new law. Due to the lateness in the production process at which these changes 
came, a comprehensive rewrite was neither feasible nor desired. This Article should 
be understood to describe the legal landscape before the 2015 Act with respect to in-
flation adjustments for civil monetary penalties, identifying the need for reform, 
explaining the policy issues that the 2015 Act would address, and anticipating the 
policy solutions that the Act ultimately offered. Notwithstanding the addition of 




Civil monetary penalties play a vital role in federal law. The Federal Civil 
Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 19901 (“the Act” or “the Inflation Adjust-
ment Act”) acknowledges that “the power of Federal agencies to impose civil 
monetary penalties . . . plays an important role in deterring violations and fur-
thering the policy goals embodied in . . . laws and regulations.”2 Over time, 
however, inflation erodes “the impact of many civil monetary penalties” and 
 1. Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 101-410, 104 Stat. 890 
(1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2461 note (2012)) (Federal Civil 
Penalties Inflation Adjustment). The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment 
Act is not codified as stand-alone sections of 28 U.S.C. It is set out, in its amended 
form, as a note to 28 U.S.C. § 2461. Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent 
citations to the Inflation Adjustment Act refer to the version that has been 
amended and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2461 note, and not to the original 1990 
version of the statute. 
 2. Id. § 2(a). 
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“weaken[s] the[ir] deterrent effect.”3 In passing the Inflation Adjustment Act, 
Congress sought to “maintain comprehensive, detailed accounting of the efforts 
of Federal agencies to assess and collect civil monetary penalties.”4 In prescrib-
ing “regular adjustment for inflation of civil monetary penalties,” Congress 
hoped to “maintain the deterrent effect of civil monetary penalties and promote 
compliance with the law” and to “improve the collection by the Federal Gov-
ernment of civil monetary penalties.”5 
Proper adjustment of civil monetary penalties is central to the mission of 
the federal government. Civil monetary penalties provide a valuable alternative 
to “all-or-nothing decisions” based on harsher remedies, such as license suspen-
sion or revocation.6 These penalties extend enforcement options beyond crimi-
nal sanctions, which expose an offender to the disgrace and disabilities associat-
ed with ‘convictions’ . . . and [which] cannot be imposed administratively.”7 
The value of civil monetary penalties is especially pronounced in areas of 
heightened regulatory concern, such as “health and safety, the environment, 
[and] consumer protection.”8 The efficacy of civil monetary penalties, however, 
proceeds from the assumption that economic loss deters private actors from 
engaging in socially destructive conduct.9 That deterrent effect may be eroded, 
even perversely distorted, if agencies do not receive appropriate statutory and 
administrative guidance for making accurate adjustments in the levels of those 
penalties as prices change across the entire United States economy. 
The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act addressed the federal 
government’s need to adjust civil monetary penalties for inflation. In 197910 and 
in 1984,11 the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) studied 
the impact of inflation on, respectively, civil penalties and federal claims settle-
ments. The 1979 ACUS recommendation urged Congress, in designing penal-
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. § 2(b). 
 6. Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction, 38 Fed. Reg. 19,782, 19,792 (July 23, 1973); see 
also id. at 19,793 (observing that “more potent sanctions . . . such as license 
suspension or revocation . . . may prove . . . unduly harsh” and may also disrupt 
the offender’s provision of essential public services). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 19,792. 
 9. See Agency Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Monetary Penalties, 44 Fed. Reg. 
38,817, 38,825 (July 3, 1979) (“A penalty intended to deter or influence economic 
behavior should, at a minimum, be designed to remove the economic benefit of 
the illegal activity.”). 
 10. See id.; see also Colin S. Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money 
Penalties by Federal Administrative Agencies, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1435 (1979). 
 11. See Administrative Settlement of Tort and Other Monetary Claims Against the 
Government, 49 Fed. Reg. 49,840 (Dec. 24, 1984).  
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ties, to adopt “simplifying assumptions about the benefit realized from or the 
harm caused by illegal activity” in order “to reduce the cost of the penalty calcu-
lation process and increase the predictability of the sanction.”12 The 1984 rec-
ommendation specifically encouraged Congress “to systematically raise ceilings 
on all agency authority to settle claims where inflation has rendered obsolete the 
present levels.”13 The passage of the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment 
Act in 1990 responded to similar concerns in the context of civil monetary pen-
alties. 
In practice, the Inflation Adjustment Act has fallen far short of these goals. 
Three statutory defects are especially salient. First, inflation adjustments under 
the Act suffer from an “inflation gap.” The Act imposes a 10% cap on initial 
penalty adjustments. That cap creates an “inflation gap” reflecting the some-
times considerable difference between penalties as adjusted under the Act and 
the levels that such penalties would reach if they were set more precisely accord-
ing to an actual measure of changes in the cost of living. This gap grows over 
time and can never be closed. 
Second, the Act directs federal agencies to use Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
data in ways that are guaranteed to be out of sync with inflation. Agencies must 
use CPI data that is at least six months old, and sometimes as much as 18 
months old. In effect, agencies lose a year of inflation every time they make an 
inflation-based adjustment. This problem is known as “CPI lag.” As with the 
“inflation gap” prescribed by the Act, errors forced by these adjustments create 
distortions relative to actual inflation. Under the existing statutory scheme, 
these errors can never be corrected. 
Third, the Act’s rules on rounding, when taken together with the initial ad-
justment cap of 10%, can effectively prevent a subsequent inflation adjustment 
for some penalties until inflation increases at least 45%. At inflation rates ap-
proximating 2.5%, refinements to initial penalty adjustments may not be per-
mitted for more than fifteen years. 
This Article will examine the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment 
Act in detail. A 2003 report by the United States General Accounting Office 
identified the difficulties that federal agencies had encountered in their imple-
mentation of the Inflation Adjustment Act.14 This Article extends the analysis 
offered by the 2003 GAO report in multiple ways. This Article comprehensively 
reviews the legislative history of the Act so that it can explain the Act’s econom-
ic problems as the consequence of Congress’s extensive but ultimately flawed 
drafting process. Through its Mathematical Appendix and its more contextual-
 12. See Agency Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Monetary Penalties, supra note 9, 
at 38,825. 
 13. See Administrative Settlement of Tort and Other Monetary Claims, supra note 11, 
at 49,841.  
 14. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-409 CIVIL PENALTIES 
AGENCIES UNABLE TO FULLY ADJUST PENALTIES FOR INFLATION UNDER CURRENT 
LAW (2003) [hereinafter 2003 GAO Report].  
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ized illustrations, this Article supplies both formal and narrative explanations of 
the Act’s shortcomings. This Article ultimately proposes concrete legislative so-
lutions to each of the statutory flaws that it identifies. 
In Part II, careful parsing of the language of the Inflation Adjustment Act 
reveals how the Act dictates three distinct sources of economic distortion in the 
inflation-based adjustment of federal civil monetary penalties: an inflation gap, 
the so-called “CPI lag,” and absurd rounding rules. By recounting the legislative 
history of the Act, Part III hopes to show how Congress came to adopt these 
provisions. 
Part IV will then devote close attention to each of the three most salient 
problems afflicting the Inflation Adjustment Act: the “inflation gap” attributa-
ble to the Act’s 10% cap on initial cost-of-living adjustments, the “CPI lag” that 
forces federal agencies to ignore between six and eighteen months of CPI data 
in adjusting civil monetary penalties, and the Act’s unwieldy rounding provi-
sions. To contextualize the Mathematical Appendix’s formal descriptions of the 
problems at hand, Part IV will provide concrete illustrations from actual federal 
civil penalties. 
Part V will recommend specific amendments to the Inflation Adjustment 
Act. The defects in the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act are pro-
found and destructive. Because they arise from the plain language of the Act, 
those defects transcend the corrective power of federal regulatory agencies. Alt-
hough some agencies have attempted to adjust civil monetary penalties in 
pragmatic ways that better reflect the real economic impact of inflation, those 
efforts do not comply with the plain language of the Inflation Adjustment Act. 
Responsibility for reform lies squarely with Congress. 
 
I. Adjusting Civil Penalties Under the Inflation Adjustment Act 
 
Section 2 of the Inflation Adjustment Act recites the broad purposes of this 
statute and, more generally, of civil monetary penalties under federal law. Con-
gress has concluded that “the power of Federal agencies to impose civil mone-
tary penalties for violations of Federal law and regulations plays an important 
role in deterring violations and furthering the policy goals embodied in such 
laws and regulations.”15 The impact of many of these penalties, however, “has 
been and is diminished due to the effect of inflation,” which “has weakened the 
deterrent effect of such penalties.”16 Congress also found that “the Federal Gov-
ernment does not maintain comprehensive, detailed accounting of the efforts of 
Federal agencies to assess and collect civil monetary penalties.”17 The Act aspires 
 15. Inflation Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 101-410, § 2(a)(1), 104 Stat. 890, 890 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2461 note (2012)). 
 16. Id. § 2(a)(2)-(3); accord In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the 
Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2015 A.M.C. 758, 759, 2015 WL 
729701, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2015) (“[I]nflation weakens the deterrent effect by 
diminishing the economic impact of such penalties.”). 
 17. Inflation Adjustment Act § 2(a)(4). 
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“to establish a mechanism” that would “(1) allow for regular adjustment for in-
flation of civil monetary penalties; (2) maintain the deterrent effect of civil 
monetary penalties and promote compliance with the law; and (3) improve the 
collection by the Federal Government of civil monetary penalties.”18 
As originally enacted in 1990, the Act did not authorize federal agencies to 
adjust penalties for inflation. Instead, the 1990 version of this legislation re-
quired the President to report to Congress every five years on the increase need-
ed to bring civil monetary penalties in line with inflation and every year on ac-
tual penalty assessments and collections. In 1996, Congress amended the Civil 
Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act to direct covered federal agencies to make 
their first inflation adjustments on October 23, 1996, and make subsequent ad-
justments “at least once every 4 years thereafter.”19 
The legislative history of the Inflation Adjustment Act reflects primary con-
gressional concern over the deterrent, punitive, and retributive purposes of fed-
eral civil monetary penalties. Congress also expressed a secondary interest in 
these penalties as a source of revenue. In his opening statement to the Senate’s 
1988 hearings on the bill that became the Act, Senator Carl Levin declared: “Civ-
il monetary penalties have been enacted into law to deter unwanted conduct. 
They send the message that if you do the crime, you are going to pay.”20 He also 
lauded the bill’s goal of “establish[ing] accountability within the Executive 
Branch for keeping track of the numbers and amounts of civil penalties im-
posed and collected,” totaling “no small amount of money” that he estimated to 
be “over $400 million a year.”21 
Senator Levin’s house counterpart, John Conyers, likewise testified in 1990: 
“At the heart of . . . regulatory statutes . . . are the monetary fines intended to 
both penalize and deter practices prohibited by these laws.”22 Because “the 
amount of fines associated with the enforcement of these important statutes 
have remained unchanged,” however, Congressman Conyers lamented that “in-
flation has eaten away at the value of these fines, effectively reducing both the 
impact and the deterrent value of regulatory penalties.”23 
Appropriate inflation-based adjustments in federal civil monetary penalties 
enable federal agencies to fulfill their regulatory missions. By giving agencies 
 18. Id. § 2(b); accord Deepwater Horizon, 2015 A.M.C. at 759. 
 19. Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 31001(s)(1)(A), 
110 Stat. 1321, 1321-373 (1996). 
 20. Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1987: Hearing Before the S. 
Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt., 100th Cong. 2 (1988) (statement of Sen. 
Carl Levin). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1989: Hearing Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Legis. & Nat’l Sec., 101st Cong. 3 (1990) (statement of Rep. John 
Conyers). 
 23. Id. 
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sufficient discretion to adjust downward from an adequately high punitive ceil-
ing, “[s]uitably severe maximum penalties allow agencies to punish willful and 
egregious violators appropriately” and to establish “deterrent[s] to future viola-
tions.”24 Proper adjustment for inflation enables agencies to keep pace with the 
persons and business entities within their spheres of regulatory responsibility. 
Section 4 of the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act, as amend-
ed in 1996, directs “[t]he head of each agency . . . by regulation” to perform an 
“inflation adjustment” for “each civil monetary penalty provided by law within 
the jurisdiction of the Federal agency.”25 The Act then instructs each agency to 
publish the resulting regulation in the Federal Register.26 Under the 1996 
amendments to the Act, the first inflation adjustment was to have been per-
formed on October 23, 1996—180 days after the amendment’s enactment date of 
April 26, 1996.27 Subsequent adjustments must be performed “at least once eve-
ry 4 years thereafter.”28 
“Section 5 of the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 
1990 . . . authorizes Executive agency adjustments for inflation of civil fines and 
penalties.”29 According to section 5, the inflation adjustment under section 4 
“shall be determined by increasing the maximum civil monetary penalty or the 
range of minimum and maximum civil monetary penalties, as applicable, for 
each civil monetary penalty by the cost-of-living adjustment.”30 In turn, “the 
term ‘cost-of-living adjustment’” is defined as “the percentage (if any) for each 
civil monetary penalty by which—(1) the Consumer Price Index for the month 
of June of the calendar year preceding the adjustment, exceeds (2) the Consum-
er Price Index for the month of June of the calendar year in which the amount 
of such civil monetary penalty was last set or adjusted pursuant to law.”31 
Section 5 of the Act also prescribes an elaborate process for the rounding of 
“[a]ny increase determined under” the statute’s inflation adjustment mecha-
nism: 
 
Any increase determined under this subsection shall be rounded to the 
nearest — 
 24. 2003 GAO Report, supra note 14, at 36. 
 25. Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134,  
§ 31001(s)(1)(A)(1), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-373. 
 26. See id. § 31001(s)(1)(A)(2).  
 27. See id. § 31001(s)(1)(A). 
 28. Id.; see Knapp v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 796 F.3d 445, 464 n.7 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 29. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 488, 503 n.5, 506 n.7 
(2011), aff’d, 728 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 30. Inflation Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 101-410, § 5(a), 104 Stat. 890, 891 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2461 note (2012)). 
 31. Id. § 5(b). 
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(1) multiple of $10 in the case of penalties less than or equal to $100; 
(2) multiple of $100 in the case of penalties greater than $100 but less 
than or equal to $1,000; 
(3) multiple of $1,000 in the case of penalties greater than $1,000 but 
less than or equal to $10,000; 
(4) multiple of $5,000 in the case of penalties greater than $10,000 but 
less than or equal to $100,000; 
(5) multiple of $10,000 in the case of penalties greater than $100,000 
but less than or equal to $200,000; 
(6) multiple of $25,000 in the case of penalties greater than $200,000.32 
 
In its 1996 amendment to the Act, Congress imposed a new 10% cap on the 
initial inflation adjustment of any civil monetary penalty required under section 
4 of the Act: “The first adjustment of a civil monetary penalty . . . may not ex-
ceed 10 percent of such penalty.”33 Section 6 of the amended Act ensures that 
inflation-adjusted increases are strictly prospective in application: “Any increase 
under this Act in a civil monetary penalty shall apply only to violations which 
occur after the date the increase takes effect.”34 
Finally, the amended Act exempts four statutes: the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986, the Tariff Act of 1930, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 
and the Social Security Act.35 The 1996 amendments to the Civil Penalties Infla-
tion Adjustment Act were effected through an omnibus budget bill, the Debt 
Collection Improvement Act of 1996.36 The legislative history of the omnibus 
Debt Collection Improvement Act provided no reason for these four statutory 
exemptions—or, for that matter, any of the other amendments to the Inflation 
Adjustment Act.37 
 
II. The Legislative History of the Inflation Adjustment Act 
 
Although the Inflation Adjustment Act does not approach the length and 
complexity of statutes such as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act or 
 32. Id. § 5(a). 
 33. Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 31001(s)(2), 110 
Stat. 1321, 1321-373. 
 34. Id. § 31001(s)(1)(C). 
 35. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-537, Making Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1996 to Make a 
Further Downpayment Toward a Balanced Budget, and for Other Purposes 386 
(1996). The passages of the legislative history accompanying section 31001 of the 
Debt Collection Improvement Act focused exclusively on procedures for debt 
collection. 
 36. Debt Collection Improvement Act § 31001(s).  
 37. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-537, supra note 35. See also Inflation Adjustment Act § 4(1).  
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the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, this statute does exhibit the traits that have 
prompted the Supreme Court to engage in all-encompassing exercises in statu-
tory interpretation. The high court has often supplemented the ordinary mean-
ing of contested statutory words with inferences drawn from overarching statu-
tory structure,38 legislative history,39 and broader understandings of a statute’s 
interaction with other bodies of law.40 
Despite its brevity, the Inflation Adjustment Act merits a comparably thor-
ough exegesis. The text, structure, and history of this Act, as well as its relation-
ship to other statutes and the record of its implementation by federal agencies, 
reveals how the Act’s practical difficulties all stem from the statute’s contested 
history in Congress. Although these sources of legal meaning typically arise in 
judicial settings, they are also germane to legal enterprises such as administra-
tive enforcement and subsequent legislative revision, including proposals for 
partial or complete repeal. 
With these interpretive considerations in mind, Part III will review the leg-
islative history of the Inflation Adjustment Act. Congress passed the Act in 1990, 
but only after three attempts to introduce the legislation. Extensive debate over 
the unsuccessful 1986 and 1987 bills strongly informed the ultimately successful 
1989 bill. Sections III.A. through III.C. will discuss each of these bills. The Infla-
tion Adjustment Act also underwent significant amendments in 1996 and 1998. 
Section III.D. will address those developments. 
 
A. Senate Bill 2559 (1986) 
 
Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey introduced the Federal Civil Pen-
alties Adjustment Act in 1986 as Senate Bill 2559.41 This bill prescribed a two-
step process for performing inflation adjustments of federal civil monetary pen-
alties according to increases in the cost of living. The first step consisted of an 
initial historical cost-of-living adjustment based on “the percentage (if any) by 
which (1) the average of the Consumer Price Index as of the close of the 12-
month period ending on September 30, 1986, exceeds (2) the average of the 
Consumer Price Index as of the close of the 12-month period ending on Sep-
tember 30 of the calendar year in which such penalty amount was last deter-
mined under law.”42 “Any increase determined under” the original Lautenberg 
bill’s historical cost-of-living adjustment would have been “rounded to the 
 38. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 39. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 40. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). 
 41. S. 2559, 99th Cong. (1986). 
 42. Id. § 4(c). 
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nearest multiple of $10.”43 The initial cost-of-living adjustment would be 
capped at “1000 percent of the original penalty amount.”44 
Thereafter, Senate Bill 2559 prescribed annual, prospective adjustments.45 
After an initial round of historical adjustments in federal civil monetary penal-
ties, a prospective series of annual adjustments, carried out by “the head of each 
Federal agency” and “publish[ed] in the Federal Register,” would apply “in lieu 
of the schedule prescribed under” the bill’s historical cost-of-living adjustment 
provision.46 Not later than December 15 of each year, this annual adjustment 
process would require each agency to increase “each base penalty amount” 
within its jurisdiction “by the cost of living adjustment” for “the succeeding cal-
endar year.”47 The bill further contemplated that each agency would “add[] to 
[its] schedule any civil monetary penalty within [its] jurisdiction . . . that was 
enacted into law in the previous calendar year and increas[e] the base penalty 
amount by the cost of living adjustment for the current calendar year.”48 
Senate Bill 2559’s definition of its “cost-of-living adjustment” plays a critical 
role in the legislative history of the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment 
Act. That definition warrants full elaboration here: 
 
[T]he cost-of-living adjustment for any calendar year is — 
(1) in the case of base penalties provided by law before December 15, 
1986, the percentage (if any) by which — 
(A) the Consumer Price Index for the preceding calendar year, exceeds 
(B) the Consumer Price Index for the calendar year 1986; and 
(2) in the case of base penalties provided by law on or after December 
15, 1986, the percentage (if any) by which — 
(A) the Consumer Price Index for the preceding calendar year, exceeds 
(B) the Consumer Price Index for the calendar year in which the base 
penalty was provided by law.49 
 
Senate Bill 2559 further defined “the Consumer Price Index for any calen-
dar year” as “the average of the Consumer Price Index as of the close of the 12-
 43. Id. § 4(b). 
 44. Id. (“[I]n no event shall such increase exceed 1000 percent of the original penalty 
amount.”). 
 45. See id. § 5(c). 
 46. Id. § 5(a). 
 47. Id. § 5(b); see also id. § 5(a) (directing “schedules of civil monetary penalties” to 
apply “in the succeeding calendar year”).  
 48. Id. § 5(b). 
 49. Id. § 5(c). 
10 
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month period ending on September 30 of such calendar year.”50 Although Sen-
ate Bill 2559 provided that any increases determined under its mechanism for 
annual, prospective cost-of-living adjustments would “be rounded to the near-
est multiple of $10,” those adjustments were not subject to any cap.51 
Senate Bill 2559’s references to “the preceding calendar year” in its discus-
sion of cost-of-living adjustments are ambiguous. One plausible reading of the 
bill’s cost-of-living adjustment confirms that portion of the contemporary stat-
ute from which “CPI lag” arises. The corresponding subsection of the Inflation 
Adjustment Act requires reference to “the Consumer Price Index for the month 
of June of the calendar year preceding the adjustment.”52 But it is also plausible 
to read this portion of Senate Bill 2559 as referring to CPI data for the nearly 
complete year preceding the bill’s December 15 deadline for annual agency ac-
tion. 
Three pieces of evidence support the latter reading. First, section 5 of Senate 
Bill 2559, titled “Annual Adjustments for Taxable Years Beginning After 1987,” 
contemplated that annual adjustments beyond the bill’s historical cost-of-living 
adjustment would take place “[n]ot later than December 15 of 1987 and each 
subsequent calendar year.”53 “[I]n the case of base penalties provided by law be-
fore December 15, 1986,” the bill prescribed an annual adjustment based on “the 
percentage (if any) by which . . . the Consumer Price Index for the preceding 
calendar year, exceeds . . . the Consumer Price Index for the calendar year 
1986.”54 For this initial adjustment (scheduled to take place no later than De-
cember 15, 1987) to make sense, the bill’s reference to “the preceding calendar 
year” must have referred to CPI data for 1987 rather than 1986. 
Second, the bill defined “the Consumer Price Index for any calendar year” 
as “the average of the Consumer Price Index as of the close of the 12-month pe-
riod ending on September 30 of such calendar year.”55 It is far more natural to 
expect that an agency head, directed by law to calculate an annual cost-of-living 
adjustment on December 15 “for the preceding year,” would use CPI data reach-
ing back from September 30 of that year to October 1 of the previous year. 
Finally, given the prevalence of concerns that civil monetary penalties were 
losing ground to inflation, it seems unlikely that Congress would have con-
sciously considered an inflation adjustment mechanism that requires federal 
agency heads to ignore an entire year of inflation data. The text of the Act, after 
all, declares that “the impact of many civil monetary penalties has been and is 
 50. Id. § 5(d). 
 51. Id. § 5(b). 
 52. Inflation Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 101-410, § 5(b)(1), 104 Stat. 890, 892 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2461 note (2012)). 
 53. S. 2559, 99th Cong. § 5(a) (1986) (emphasis added). 
 54. Id. § 5(c). 
 55. Id. § 5(d). 
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diminished due to the effect of inflation” and that “inflation has weakened the 
deterrent effect of such penalties.”56 
 
B. Senate Bill 1014 (1987) 
 
Senator Lautenberg’s proposal to adjust federal civil monetary penalties for 
inflation underwent considerable debate and revision. The Subcommittee on 
Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Committee on Govern-
mental Affairs conducted hearings to consider what by 1988 had become the 
proposed Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1987.57 
Senate Bill 1014 retained the distinctive two-step cost-of-living adjustment 
prescribed by Senate Bill 2559. The first step prescribed a historical adjustment 
based on “the percentage (if any) by which (1) the average of the Consumer 
Price Index as of the close of the 12-month period ending on September 30, 
1987, exceeds . . . (2) the average of the Consumer Price Index as of the close of 
the 12-month period ending on September 30 of the calendar year in which such 
penalty amount was last determined under law.”58 Senate Bill 1014 made a mate-
rial change to the first step of the two-step cost-of-living adjustment. Whereas 
Senator Lautenberg’s original bill had provided that the historical cost-of-living 
adjustment “in no event shall . . . exceed 1000 percent of the original penalty 
amount,”59 Senate Bill 1014 omitted any mention of a cap on its initial adjust-
ment. 
As a second step, Senate Bill 1014 prescribed annual, prospective adjust-
ments.60 Beginning no later than December 15, 1988, Senate Bill 1014 directed 
agency heads to make annual cost-of-living adjustments according to “the per-
centage (if any) by which . . . (A) the Consumer Price Index for the preceding 
calendar year, exceeds (B) the Consumer Price Index for the calendar year 
1987.”61 “[I]n the case of base penalties provided by law on or after December 15, 
1987,” agencies would make annual cost-of-living adjustments according to “the 
percentage (if any) by which . . . (A) the Consumer Price Index for the preced-
ing calendar year, exceeds (B) the Consumer Price Index for the calendar year 
in which the base penalty was provided by law.”62 
Finally, Senate Bill 1014 preserved other aspects of annual adjustments un-
der Senate Bill 2559. Retaining the original bill’s approach to rounding, Senate 
Bill 1014 directed that “[a]ny increase determined under” the new bill’s histori-
 56. Inflation Adjustment Act § 2(a)(2)-(3). 
 57. S. 1014, 100th Cong. (1987). 
 58. Id. § 4(c) (annotations added). 
 59. S. 2559, 99th Cong. § 4(b) (1986). 
 60. See S. 1014, 100th Cong. § 5(c) (1987). 
 61. Id. § 5(c)(1) (annotations added). 
 62. Id. (annotations added). 
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cal cost-of-living adjustment “shall be rounded to the nearest multiple of $10.”63 
Although any subsequent annual, prospective adjustments prescribed by Senate 
Bill 1014 would not be subject to any cap, they would also “be rounded to the 
nearest multiple of $10.”64 
 
1. Hearings on Senate Bill 1014 (1988) 
 
In January 1988, the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government 
Management of the Committee on Governmental Affairs held a hearing on 
Senate Bill 1014.65 This pivotal hearing enabled government agencies and the 
public to influence the consideration of inflation-based adjustment of civil 
monetary penalties. In virtually every meaningful respect, this hearing trans-
formed Senator Lautenberg’s original bills into the law that eventually became 
the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990. Many witnesses 
deemed annual adjustments to be too frequent and too burdensome. The sub-
committee also heard considerable criticism that automatic adjustments report-
ed solely in the Federal Register would increase civil monetary penalties without 
appropriate notice and due process. Finally, the subcommittee was evidently 
persuaded to adopt a more elaborate rounding mechanism than Senator 
Lautenberg’s simple $10 provision. 
The subcommittee hearing emphasized the frequency of inflation-based ad-
justments to civil monetary penalties. The deputy director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB) proposed that adjustments should occur every 
three to five years.66 Concerned that “the cost of carrying out an annual ad-
justment would outweigh the incremental revenues collected as a result of the 
adjustment,”67 the deputy director argued that that annual adjustments might 
not properly deter private misconduct: “Very often, the statutory amount is a 
ceiling, i.e., a figure representing the maximum sum the government could im-
pose. But administrators, for one reason or another, do not always seek or 
threaten to impose the maximum amount. Thus increases by small, regular in-
crements may serve no purpose at all.”68 
The Interstate Commerce Commission also favored a five-year adjustment 
cycle: “[D]eveloping cases based on small penalties often requires agency staff 
to document large numbers of counts to support a penalty which would realis-
tically serve as a deterrent . . . . Subsequently, a year-to-year inflation adjust-
 63. Id. § 4(b). 
 64. Id.  
 65. See generally Federal Civil Penalties Adjustment Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 1014 
Before the S. Comm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt., 100th Cong. (1988) [hereinafter 
Hearing on S. 1014]. 
 66. Id. at 7 (statement of Joseph Wright, Jr.). 
 67. Id. at 43. 
 68. Id. at 42-43 (emphasis added). 
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ment would not appear necessary; a 5-year renew cycle might be an appropriate 
alternative.”69 
The bill’s sponsors resisted the suggestion of a five-year cycle. Senator 
Lautenberg said, “I do not like to see us at first blush extend the review period 
to five years. Because if we look at one of the worst periods of inflation that we 
had in our history, a period ranging from 1979—1981, I mean we would be look-
ing at a substantial change in the value of the penalty; and maybe three years.”70 
Senator Lautenberg added, “I have kind of a preference that it should be bian-
nual [sic], every 2 years, or every 3 years, because in 5 years, you could have in-
flation running strong.”71 
Fearing “a significant reduction in deterrent value,” the legislative director 
of Public Citizen’s Congress Watch also advocated more frequent adjustments: 
“[W]e would like to see it done as often as possible. We prefer 1 year. . . . [Five] 
years . . . is really quite a long time. . . . If inflation stayed [between four and five 
percent], the difference between a statute passed today and 5 years from now 
would be a diminution in value of 20 to 25 percent.”72 
This debate over the frequency of inflation adjustments should be seen in 
historical context. In 1988, the galloping inflation of the 1970s remained salient. 
The participants in the Senate hearing feared the burden of identifying all civil 
monetary penalties and updating them once a year. Presumably, advances in 
computing power, as well as the accessibility of inflation data, would allay those 
fears today. And even though inflation since 1988 has never returned to the lev-
els that it reached during the 1970s, it is worth noting that an annual 2.5% in-
crease in inflation, compounded over five years, would require a 13% adjust-
ment at the end of that period. (1.0255 ≈ 1.131.) Though a 13% increase is less than 
the 20% to 25% increase presented to the Subcommittee, 13% nevertheless ex-
ceeds the 10% threshold that Congress adopted as the limit on the first adjust-
ment of a civil monetary penalty. 
Participants in the Senate hearing also expressed concerns that an automat-
ic adjustment mechanism would not provide private parties adequate notice of 
increases in civil monetary penalties: “[T]he language identifying the prohibited 
conduct will be found in the statute, while the size of the penalty will be found 
elsewhere in the Federal Register. There is obvious opportunity for confusion 
 69. Id. at 94 (letter from William Love, Acting Dir., to Sen. Carl Levin (Feb. 23, 1988)). 
 70. Id. at 16 (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg). 
 71. Id. at 31 (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg). Senator Lautenberg undoubtedly 
meant “biennial” rather than “biannual.” A biennial adjustment would take place 
every second year. A biannual adjustment takes place every six months, or twice in 
a single year. See BILL BRYSON, BRYSON’S DICTIONARY FOR WRITERS AND EDITORS 39 
(3d ed. 2008). 
 72. Hearing on S. 1014, supra note 65, at 31 (statement of Michael Waldman). 
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and mistakes, particularly [by] those . . . who seek to evaluate the consequences 
of certain conduct or practices that may impinge upon the law.”73 
A witness from the Department of Justice’s Civil Division likewise suggest-
ed that civil penalties might lack deterrent power if penalties published “in the 
Federal Register each year” were at odds with “the original dollar amount” stip-
ulated in “statutes that contain the terms themselves.”74 According to the gen-
eral counsel for the Department of Transportation, the annual publication of 
inflation adjustments in the Federal Register could make it “difficult for those 
subject to our statutes to understand what the current penalty is at a particular 
time, and whether the applicable penalty was that in place at the time of the vio-
lation, or that in place at the time enforcement is initiated.”75 
One witness did dispute “whether proper notice would be provided to the 
public of the new penalties, so as not to violate . . . due process rights.”76 An at-
torney for the Congressional Research Service testified that “[u]nder the Federal 
Register Act, publication serves as constructive notice to the public.”77 Because 
“the bill provides that the heads of the agencies will list specific schedules of 
penalties, and that enforcement of such penalties will not occur until after pub-
lication,” he argued that “any individuals who are later fined will have had con-
structive notice.”78 
Finally, the Senate hearing addressed the rounding of inflation-based ad-
justments. Senate Bill 1014 and its predecessor, Senate Bill 2559, had both pro-
vided that cost-of-living adjustments would be rounded to the nearest multiple 
of $10. During the hearing, Senator Lautenberg expressed doubt over his own 
rounding mechanism: “[T]he original bill provides that all adjusted penalties 
are to be rounded off to the nearest 10 dollars. I would suggest that larger penal-
ties should be rounded off to larger numbers. Maybe even the 10 dollars is too 
small, but that is something that we ought to work on.”79 The Chairman of the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposed the rounding of penalties “to the 
nearest increment of the original penalty to minimize calculation error.”80 The 
President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency concluded that inflation ad-
justments, together with Senator Lautenberg’s proposed rounding mechanism, 
 73. Id. at 136 (letter from Thomas M. Boyd, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., to Sen. Carl 
Levin (Apr. 14, 1988)). 
 74. Id. at 14 (statement of Stuart E. Schiffer, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.). 
 75. Id. at 103 (letter from B. Wayne Vance to Sen. Carl Levin (Feb. 23, 1988)). 
 76. Id. at 230 (letter from Kenneth R. Thomas, Legislative Att’y, Cong. Res. Serv., to 
Sen. Carl Levin (Feb. 26, 1988)). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 4 (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg). 
 80. Id. at 120 (letter from Lando W. Zech, Jr., to Sen. Carl Levin (Mar. 4, 1988)). 
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would have “very little” or even “minimal” impact on “just over 40 percent of” 
affected penalties.81 
 
2. Amendments to Senate Bill 1014 
 
“In response to . . . concerns” expressed at the hearing on Senate Bill 1014, 
the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management “substantially re-
vised the bill.”82 The Subcommittee deleted Senator Lautenberg’s automatic ad-
justment provision: “Instead of requiring an automatic inflation adjustment 
published only in the Federal Register, the revised bill provides for the President 
to report to Congress every five years as to which penalties need to be adjusted, 
and by how much, to keep up with inflation.”83 Absent “automatic, across-the-
board adjustment,” the revised bill contemplated that “separate legislative ac-
tion” would be “required to make each adjustment.”84 The revision likewise ad-
dressed “[c]oncerns about the excessive frequency of adjustments . . . by requir-
ing that adjustments be calculated and reported to Congress every five years, 
rather than every year.”85 
Though the Subcommittee unanimously approved the revision, and though 
the Justice Department expressed no objection, the full governmental affairs 
committee lacked “time to act on the bill before the end of the session.”86 
 
C. Senate Bill 535 (1989) 
 
Senators Lautenberg and Levin introduced Senate Bill 535 in the 101st Con-
gress on March 8, 1989.87 Senate Bill 535 was identical to Senate Bill 1014, as 
amended by the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Manage-
ment.88 In House hearings on Senate Bill 535, Senator Lautenberg acknowledged 
that he and his colleagues had “modified the legislation in response to concerns 
 81. Id. at 41 (report prepared by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency 
(July 1, 1988)). 
 82. Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1989: Report of the Comm. on 
Governmental Affairs to Accompany S.535, to Increase Civil Monetary Penalties Based 
on the Effect of Inflation, 101st Cong. 5 (1990). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. S. 535, 101st Cong. (1989). 
 88. See Hearing on S. 1014, supra note 65, at 5.  
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raised by the administration and others.”89 The House concurred in the Sen-
ate’s approval of Senate Bill 535 and recommended the bill’s passage. 
Most of the features of the contemporary Inflation Adjustment Act can be 
traced to Senate Bill 535. This bill resolved the ambiguity in previous references 
to “the preceding calendar year” by unambiguously defining “the term ‘cost-of-
living adjustment’” as “the percentage (if any) for each civil monetary penalty 
by which—(1) the Consumer Price Index for the month of June of the calendar 
year preceding the adjustment, exceeds (2) the Consumer Price Index for the 
month of June of the calendar year in which the amount of such civil monetary 
penalty was last set or adjusted pursuant to law.”90 This definition codified the 
anomaly of the Inflation Adjustment Act known as “CPI lag.” 
In addition, Senate Bill 535 replaced earlier bills’ simple $10 rounding provi-
sion with an elaborate, six-tiered mechanism: 
 
Any increase determined under this subsection shall be rounded to the 
nearest — 
(1) multiple of $10 in the case of penalties less than or equal to $100; 
(2) multiple of $100 in the case of penalties greater than $100 but less 
than or equal to $1,000; 
(3) multiple of $1,000 in the case of penalties greater than $1,000 but 
less than or equal to $10,000; 
(4) multiple of $5,000 in the case of penalties greater than $10,000 but 
less than or equal to $100,000; 
(5) multiple of $10,000 in the case of penalties greater than $100,000 
but less than or equal to $200,000; 
(6) multiple of $25,000 in the case of penalties greater than $200,000.91 
 
This mechanism is the source of contemporary concerns over the rounding 
of civil monetary penalties under the Inflation Adjustment Act. 
Congress enacted Senate Bill 535 as the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Ad-
justment Act of 1990.92 
 
D. Legislative Developments After 1990 
 
In 1993, Congress defeated an effort to amend the Inflation Adjustment Act. 
One provision of House Bill 3400 would have made cost-of-living adjustments 
 89. Federal Civil Penalties Adjustment Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 535 Before the 
Subcomm. on Legis. & Nat’l Sec., supra note 22, at 21 (statement of Sen. Frank 
Lautenberg). 
 90. S. 535 § 5(b) (emphasis added). 
 91. Id. § 5(a). 
 92. Act of Oct. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-410, 104 Stat. 890 (1990). 
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automatic.93 As the Senate report on that bill observed: “Currently the Act . . . 
requires a report on the penalties to be provided to the Congress, but does not 
actually index the penalties to inflation. This provision simply executes the pur-
pose already approved by Congress . . . .”94 In addition, by virtue of its silence 
on the issue, House Bill 3400 would have imposed no percentage cap on initial 
adjustments. Had this provision become law, it would have made the first ad-
justment a complete and automatic cost-of-living adjustment, subject to the 
one-year CPI lag imposed by the definition of “cost-of-living adjustment” in 
section 5(b) of the Act. Speaking in opposition to the provision of the Senate 
bill that mirrored House Bill 3400, Senator William Roth argued that it was in-
appropriate to delegate to agency heads a task with the practical effect of an au-
tomatic adjustment.95 
Three years later, Congress did amend the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation 
Adjustment Act through a provision of the omnibus Debt Collection Improve-
ment Act of 1996.96 This amendment accomplished something that Senator 
Lautenberg had originally proposed in 1986, but subsequent legislative consid-
eration had blocked: automatic adjustment of civil monetary penalties for infla-
tion by federal agency heads.97 That adjustment would take place at least every 
four years.98 
The 1996 amendment also capped initial inflation adjustments, without re-
gard to the temporal gap between that adjustment and the previous statutory 
designation of penalty amounts, at 10%.99 The 1996 amendment thus introduced 
the 10% cap that serves as the source of the contemporary Inflation Adjustment 
Act’s “inflation gap.” It also retained two other distinctive (and ultimately un-
wieldy) features of the original 1990 statute: the “CPI lag” introduced by the 
statute’s reliance on CPI figures for “for the month of June of the calendar year 
preceding the adjustment,”100 as well as the Act’s elaborate, six-tiered rounding 
mechanism. 
The Debt Collection Improvement Act was an omnibus budget bill. The 
legislative record consequently left no trace of any discussion in which Congress 
 93. H.R. 3400, 103d Cong. § 16010 (1993).  
 94. S. REP. NO. 103-281, at 15 (1994); see also id. at 35-36 (adopting Section 16010 of H.R. 
3400 as Section 410 of the corresponding Senate bill). 
 95. Id. at 37 (statement of Sen. William Roth). 
 96. Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 31001(s), 110 Stat. 
1321, 1321-373.  
 97. Id. § 31001(s)(1)(A). 
 98. See id. (calling for the first adjustment to be performed October 23, 1996—180 days 
after the amending statute’s enactment date of April 26, 1996—and directing 
subsequent adjustments to be performed “at least once every 4 years thereafter”). 
 99. See id. § 31001(s)(2). 
 100. Inflation Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 101-410, § 5(b)(1), 104 Stat. 890, 892 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2461 note (2012)). 
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might have debated the amendments to the Inflation Adjustment Act.101 It is 
nevertheless striking that the 1996 amendment prescribed automatic cost-of-
living adjustments—a highly controversial mechanism that some advocates of 
this legislation had championed and other parties had vehemently opposed—
and simultaneously adopted a 10% cap on initial adjustments. Despite the ab-
sence of legislative history, it is not far-fetched to speculate that the 10% cap 
may have arisen as a compromise in exchange for the controversial automatic 
adjustment mechanism, one to be carried out by agency heads and published in 
the Federal Register, in lieu of piecemeal congressional amendment. 
A 1998 amendment to the Inflation Adjustment Act abolished the Presi-
dent’s obligation to provide annual reports under the original statute.102 
 
III. Problems Created by the Mechanics of the Inflation Adjustment 
Act 
 
I will now address in detail the three most salient concerns about the 
amended Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act. First, Part III.A. will 
discuss the “inflation gap” arising from the statute’s 10% cap on initial adjust-
ments. Part III.B. will then examine the “CPI lag” attributable to the statute’s 
directive that federal agencies base their cost-of-living adjustments on CPI data 
no fewer than six months old and possibly as old as 18 months. Finally, Part 
III.C. will describe how the Act’s rounding mechanism confounds the rational 
adjustment of federal civil penalties to reflect the impact of inflation. 
 
A. The “Inflation Gap” 
 
The 10% cap imposed by the 1996 amendment, when coupled with 
§ 5(b)(2)’s reference to the most recent inflation adjustment, creates a perma-
nent “inflation gap.” That gap is equivalent to the difference between (1) the ac-
tual increase in inflation since the last adjustment in the penalty amount before 
the Inflation Adjustment Act, and (2) 10%. 
As time passes, the Inflation Adjustment Act prevents closure of the infla-
tion gap. The gap created by the 1996 amendment’s 10% cap, expressed as the 
ratio of accumulated inflation to 10%, does remain constant. But the absolute 
amount will grow: 
 101. See 2003 GAO Report, supra note 14, at 22 (“The limited legislative history . . . 
regarding the 1996 amendment to the Inflation Adjustment Act does not explain 
why the 10 percent cap was established.”). The 2003 GAO report, however, is not 
precisely correct in asserting that “[u]ntil the 1996 amendment, no earlier 
executive branch or congressional initiative had called for any cap on the amount 
of inflation adjustments.” Id. Senator Lautenberg’s original bills, Senate Bill 2559 
and the unamended version of Senate Bill 1014, both proposed to cap first-stage, 
“historical” cost-of-living adjustments at 1000%. 
 102. Federal Reports Elimination Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-362, title XIII, § 1301(a), 
112 Stat. 3280, 3293 (1998). 
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Absolute inflation gap over time 
 
≈ p ⋅[(1+ p )t −1.1] ⋅ (1+ p )g  
 
where the variable 
 
p  represents average annual inflation, p represents the orig-
inal penalty, t represents the number of years between the original penalty and 
the initial adjustment, and g represents the number of subsequent years after 
the initial adjustment over which inflation grows. Consistent with the conven-
tions of macroeconomic literature, the rate of inflation is designated by the 
symbol, p. 
Consistent with the General Accounting Office’s 2003 study of the Inflation 
Adjustment Act, this Article will simplify many of its calculations by assuming 
that inflation constantly increases at a fixed annual rate of 2.5%.103 Relaxing this 
assumption introduces only marginally more complexity into our expression of 
the absolute inflation gap: 
 
Absolute inflation gap over time  
 
 
where i and j are indexing variables facilitating the expression of different rates 
of inflation for different years and “capital pi” notation signifies multiplicative 
series. This more general expression of the absolute inflation gap requires no 
assumptions about inflation rates over the long run, let alone the equivalence of 
past and future inflation rates. Indeed, if average inflation over the next g years 
is designated by the variable 
 
q , we can recast our original description of the ab-
solute inflation gap in terms of different rates of past and future inflation:  
 
Absolute inflation gap over time 
 
≈ p ⋅[(1+ p )t −1.1] ⋅ (1+ q )g 
 
The following worked example illustrates the effect of the inflation gap. Let 
p represent the amount of the original, unadjusted penalty. Assume that 20 
years (t) pass between the original penalty and its first adjustment. If the penalty 
had been fully adjusted for inflation at the time of its first adjustment, it would 
have been raised to (1.025 ^ 20) · p, or approximately 1.639 · p. But the Inflation 
Adjustment Act’s 10% cap on initial increases would cap the increased penalty at 
1.1 · p. The ratio between an adjusted penalty that accurately reflected inflation 
and a penalty adjusted according to the Act’s 10% gap is 1.639 to 1.1, or approxi-
mately 1.490. 
Ten more years pass, at which point a second adjustment for inflation is 
made. In other words, g = 10. Had the original penalty, p, been adjusted strictly 
in accordance with inflation over the course of thirty years (20 + 10), it would 
be approximately 2.098 · p: 1.02520 · 1.02510 · p = 1.02530 · p ≈ 2.098 · p. The penalty 
now reflects a further increase of inflation of approximately 28% in the 10 years 
that have passed since the initial twenty-year adjustment: 1.025g = 1.02510 ≈ 1.280. 
 103. See 2003 GAO Report, supra note 14, at 10. 
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Adjusting for inflation in strict accordance with federal law, however, yields a 
different answer. The Act’s 10% cap on initial adjustments means that the infla-
tion-adjusted penalty, after the passage of the full 30 years (20 after the original 
penalty, plus another 10) is now 1.1 · 1.02510 · p, or approximately 1.408 · p. After t 
+ g years, or 30 = 20 + 10, the ratio between an economically adjusted penalty 
and one adjusted according to the Act remains approximately 1.490 (since 
2.098/1.408 ≈ 1.490). The 1.408 multiplier attributable to the 10 years of inflation 
that passed between the initial adjustment and the later adjustment applies 
equally to an economically accurate penalty and to a penalty subject to the In-
flation Adjustment Act’s initial 10% cap. Further details and formal analysis are 
provided in Part II.A of the Mathematical Appendix. 
In its 2003 study of the Inflation Act, the GAO provided a vivid example of 
the inflation gap in action.104 In 1996, the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) adjusted a maximum $1,000 penalty for possession of a firearm discov-
ered at a baggage security checkpoint. That penalty had been set in 1958 and had 
gone unadjusted until 1996. The CPI increase from June 1958 to June 1995 
(which section 5(b) of the Inflation Adjustment Act required the FAA to apply, 
over the more recent, more relevant, and more accurate CPI figure for June 
1996) was 427.7%. A straightforward application of the cost-of-living adjustment 
described above would have yielded an adjusted penalty of $5,277. The 1996 
amendment to the Inflation Adjustment Act, however, forced the FAA to cap 
this adjusted penalty at $1,100—$4,177 less than a full adjustment for inflation 
between 1958 and 1995. 
In a 1999 regulation that adjusted civil monetary penalties for inflation, the 
National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) expressed 
specific concern that the Inflation Adjustment Act’s 10% cap impaired the 
Agency’s effort “to enhance the deterrent effect of [its] penalties because of their 
importance to [its] enforcement programs.”105 To illustrate the agency’s con-
cern that the Act’s prescribed inflation adjustments would provide “less than 
adequate . . . deterrent[s] to violations”106 of various provisions of 49 U.S.C., 
especially those portions of chapters 301, 325, and 327 that proscribe odometer 
tampering, require the provision of consumer information regarding vehicle 
crashworthiness, and set safety standards for bumpers,107 NHTSA identified a 
penalty that had originally been set by statute at $800,000. That penalty “would 
have increased more than threefold, to $2.45 million, in June 1996 if [fully] ad-
justed for inflation.”108 The 10% cap, however limited the adjusted penalty to 
$880,000. “[U]nder this aggregate penalty ceiling,” NHTSA observed, “on a per 
 104. See 2003 GAO Report, supra note 14, at 18-19. 
 105. Civil Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,876, 37,877 (July 14, 1999) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 
578). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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vehicle basis the maximum penalty amounts to less than one dollar per vehicle 
where a substantial fleet was in violation of the Safety Act . . . .”109 
Notably, the foregoing examples of the inflation gap in FAA and NHTSA 
penalties are not merely stylized examples based on a constant 2.5% rate of an-
nual inflation. Rather, these examples are based on actual inflation figures. Part 
I.C of the Mathematical Appendix reports monthly inflation from January 1965 
through August 2015, including the crucial values for CPI-U (Consumer Price 
Index for All Urban Consumers) for June of each year. 
 
B. CPI Lag 
 
The Inflation Adjustment Act, as amended, does not require agencies to set 
inflation adjustments according to the most recent available CPI data or even 
CPI data for the most recent benchmark month. Rather, section 5(b) defines 
“the term ‘cost-of-living adjustment’ as the percentage (if any) for each civil 
monetary penalty by which—the Consumer Price Index for the month of June 
of the calendar year preceding the adjustment, exceeds . . . the Consumer Price 
Index for the month of June of the calendar year in which the amount of such 
civil monetary penalty was last set or adjusted pursuant to law.”110 The previ-
ous-June-to-distant-June methodology prescribed by § 5(b) creates an intermit-
tent CPI lag, or the potential loss of an entire year of inflation adjustment each 
time an agency readjusts civil monetary penalties for intervening increases in 
the cost of living. CPI lag exacerbates the gap between actual inflation and legal-
ly dictated adjustments in civil monetary penalties under the Inflation Adjust-
ment Act. This distortion compounds any inflation gap that may result from 
the 10% cap on an initial inflation adjustment under the Act. Truly perversely, if 
an agency tries to adjust its penalties for inflation more frequently, that attempt 
at regularity aggravates the effects of CPI lag and creates an even wider gap be-
tween legally adjusted penalties and a hypothetical penalty adjusted strictly in 
response to inflation. 
Section 5(b)(1)’s requirement that agencies consult CPI “for the month of 
June of the calendar year preceding [an inflation] adjustment” commits agencies 
to ignore the most recent year of inflation every time they adjust a civil mone-
tary penalty for inflation.111 Each round of adjustments under the Act therefore 
introduces an additional error, equivalent in magnitude to the most recent 
June-to-June change in CPI. Over multiple iterations, CPI lag compounds and 
can become quite considerable. 
Part II.B of the Mathematical Appendix formally describes the effects of 
CPI lag. For a prospective period of s years, subsequent to an initial adjustment, 
during which an agency expects to adjust penalties for inflation at a frequency 
 109. Id. 
 110. Inflation Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 101-410, § 5(b), 104 Stat. 890, 891-92 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2461 note (2012)). 
 111. Id. § 5(b)(1). 
22 
 
Chen Article FINALPROD.doc (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2016 4:29 PM 
INFLATION-BASED ADJUSTMENTS IN FEDERAL CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES  
of once every f years, the cumulative lag can be predicted with the following 
equation: 
Cumulative CPI lag  
 
where the partial brackets indicate the floor, or “greatest integer” function, 
which is the largest integer which is less than or equal to s/f.112 A more general, 
nonparametric expression of this effect replaces the exponentiation of average 
inflation with a multiplicative series of inflation actually observed in years that 
must be ignored through strict adherence to the Inflation Adjustment Act: 
 
Cumulative CPI lag 
 
≈ (1+ p f ) ⋅ (1+ p 2 f ) ⋅… ⋅ (1+ p f s f  ) −1 
 
By way of illustration, I again offer a worked example. Suppose that an 
agency chooses to adjust its penalties for inflation every three years (f = 3) over 
an eleven-year period (s = 11). With a constant annual inflation rate of 2.5%, 
cumulative CPI lag will be 1.025[11/3] – 1, or 1.0253 – 1 ≈ 7.7%. The reason for this 
lag is that an agency observing a three-year cycle between adjustments can be 
expected to make three adjustments during an eleven-year span. Therefore, if 
inflation rises by a constant 2.5% every year, the compounded effect of three 
years’ inflation will be approximately 7.7%. 
If we relax the assumption that inflation remains constant, cumulative CPI 
lag results from the compounding of inflation in years that must be skipped in 
accordance with the language of the Inflation Adjustment Act. In the foregoing 
example, penalties are adjusted every third year, which means that the CPI lag 
after eleven years is the compounded product of inflation as it occurs—and is 
ignored by operation of law—during years three, six, and nine. 
The GAO’s 2003 report on the Inflation Adjustment Act provides a vivid il-
lustration of CPI lag over time.113 In a 1999 adjustment, NHTSA expressed its 
frustration that the Inflation Adjustment Act prevented the agency from tri-
pling penalties for violations of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety 
Act of 1966 from $800,000 to $2.45 million and instead capped NHTSA’s fine at 
$880,000, or 10% over $800,000.114 The same example also illustrates the delete-
rious effects of CPI lag. Thanks to CPI lag, multiple rounds of inflation adjust-
ments, even if not handicapped by the initial 10% cap, would fall even further 
behind actual inflation. Perversely enough, the distortion attributable to CPI lag 
 112. See NICHOLAS J. HIGHAM, HANDBOOK OF WRITING FOR THE MATHEMATICAL 
SCIENCES 25 (2d ed. 1998); KENNETH E. IVERSON, A PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE 12 
(1962). See generally RONALD L. GRAHAM, DONALD E. KNUTH & OREN PATASHNIK, 
CONCRETE MATHEMATICS: A FOUNDATION FOR COMPUTER SCIENCE ch. 3 (2d ed. 
1994). 
 113. See 2003 GAO Report, supra note 14, at 23-26 (especially figs. 3, 4 & 5). 
 114. See Civil Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,876, 37,877 (July 14, 1999) (to be codified at 49 
C.F.R. pt. 578). 
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would have been even greater if NHTSA had made two rather than one adjust-
ments in a four-year span: 
 
Inflation from 1996 through 2000, with no lag: 10.0% 
Inflation from 1996 through 1999: 6.1%. The amount of one year in CPI 
lag would have been approximately (1.1/1.061) − 1, or approximately 
3.7% 
Inflation from 1996-97 and 1998-99: 4.3%. The amount of two years in 
CPI lag would have been approximately (1.1/1.043) − 1, or approximate-
ly 5.5% 
 
The foregoing figures are based on actual inflation numbers from 1996 to 2000, 
as reported in Part I.C of the Mathematical Appendix. These figures are con-
sistent with the amount of distortion that this Article’s formula for cumulative 
CPI lag would predict after two rounds of inflation adjustments: 1.100 / 




From its origins in Senator Lautenberg’s original bills, Senate Bill 2559 and 
Senate Bill 1014, the Inflation Adjustment Act has always contemplated some 
form of rounding. But the Act ultimately adopted a rounding mechanism that 
lacks the simple elegance of a directive that all cost-of-living increases “be 
rounded to the nearest multiple of $10.”115 Instead, section 5(a) of the Act pre-
scribes an elaborate six-tiered schedule for rounding. One of these directives 
will serve to illustrate the set. Under the Act, any cost-of-living adjustment shall 
be “rounded to the nearest . . . multiple of $100 in the case of penalties greater 
than $100 but less than or equal to $1,000.”116 
The evident intent underlying this provision was to prevent the use of 
awkward amounts in the adjustment of civil monetary penalties. But the round-
ing rules use the size of the penalty as opposed to the size of the increase as the 
trigger for rounding. As a result, the precise wording of the Inflation Adjust-
ment Act creates some absurd results. The Act’s rounding provisions “can’t 
mean what [they] say[].”117 
Under this provision, some penalties (particularly smaller ones) may take 
as long as seventeen years to trigger an increase given the rounding, coupled 
with the 10% initial cap, since (1 + 0.025)17 ≈ 1.5. The details of this calculation 
are laid out in Part II.C of the Mathematical Appendix. Over time, the rounding 
mechanism prescribed by the Act has the effect of withholding increases for cer-
 115. S. 2559, 99th Cong. §§ 4(b), 5(b) (1986); S. 1014, 100th Cong., §§ 4(b), 5(b) (1987). 
 116. Inflation Adjustment Act § 5(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
 117. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511 (1989) (quoting Campbell 
v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
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tain penalties, only to unleash startlingly large increases after a long latency pe-
riod. Delaying increases and then rounding them up to the nearest ten, hun-
dred, or thousand dollar amount can trigger penalty increases twice the scale of 
the inflation that finally merits an increase under the Inflation Adjustment Act. 
A little back-of-the-envelope mathematics provide a glance at the problems 
created by the rounding rules. I shall begin at the lower end of one of the six 
rounding categories defined by section 5(a) of the Inflation Adjustment Act. 
The impact of the rounding rules is much more pronounced toward the lower 
end of each rounding category.118 A $101 statutory penalty is, in the language of 
section 5(a)(2), “greater than $100 but less than or equal to $1,000.”119 Because a 
cost-of-living adjustment to this penalty must be “rounded to nearest . . . mul-
tiple of $100,” there can be no such adjustment until inflation dictates an in-
crease of at least $50.120 Assuming that inflation increases at a constant annual 
rate of 2.5%, we can calculate the number of years (represented by the variable t) 
that must pass before the agency can make an adjustment. The formula involves 
comparing 1.025 raised to the exponent t, with the sum of 1 and 50/101. The fol-
lowing calculation shows that the agency must wait seventeen years before per-
forming one $100 adjustment121: 
 
 
1.025t ≥ 1+ 50101 ≈ 1.495
t ⋅ ln(1.025) ≈ ln(1.495)
t ≈ 16.29
t  ≈ 17
 
 
In that seventeenth year—by which time inflation is projected to have in-
creased 52.16%—the $100 increase will represent a 99% increase over the $101 
base penalty. Although the Act’s congressional findings, stated purposes, and 
legislative history all focus on what had been the failure of federal civil mone-
tary penalties to keep pace with inflation, adjustments in excess of inflation pose 
a distinct, significant problem in their own right. Every regulatory regime 
strikes some balance between enforcement and deterrence, between socially del-
eterious and privately beneficial behavior. Many acts subject to federal regula-
tion are, at least to some degree, essential to the proper functioning of a market-
based economy. Adjustments that are effectively double the rate of inflation ele-
vate regulatory deterrence above levels that Congress originally contemplated 
and may inhibit business activities of the sort and/or at a level that Congress in-
tended to permit. 
 118. See 2003 GAO Report, supra note 14, at 29. 
 119. Inflation Adjustment Act § 5(a)(2). 
 120. Id. 
 121. The inverted partial brackets indicate the ceiling function, which is the smallest 
integer that is greater than or equal to t. See sources cited supra note 112. 
 25 
 
Chen Article FINALPROD.doc (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2016 4:29 PM 
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 34 : 1 2015 
Excessive inflation adjustments assuredly undermine the broader purposes 
of the Inflation Adjustment Act. To be sure, the tenor of the Act’s legislative his-
tory emphasizes the need to increase civil monetary penalties in an inflationary 
economic environment. True to a statute whose “inflation adjustment” speaks 
exclusively of “increasing the maximum civil monetary penalty or the range of 
minimum and maximum civil monetary penalties . . . by the cost-of-living ad-
justment,”122 the Act’s legislative history does not directly address the prospect 
of adjustments in excess of inflation or the negative consequences of such exces-
sive adjustments. But other areas of law using inflation-based adjustments do 
reflect this concern. For example, in using the CPI to adjust attorney’s fees un-
der the Equal Access to Justice Act,123 courts are admonished to “avoid the pos-
sibility of a ‘windfall’” by declining to “award an inflation-adjusted rate that is 
higher than the prevailing market rate . . . for comparable legal services.”124 
The 2003 GAO report provides a real-life example of these effects.125 The 
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration (PWBA) performed cost-of-living 
adjustments for penalties that had originally been set by statute at $10, $100, and 
$1,000. Section 6 of the Inflation Adjustment Act, as amended, capped initial 
adjustments at 10% each. That 10% cap would result in new penalties of $11, 
$110, and $1,100. Because the Act’s rounding provisions would require the next 
adjustment to be rounded by a full $10, $100, or $1,000, respectively, no increase 
could take place until CPI had risen by 45.5% from the level that prevailed when 
the PWBA first adjusted its $10, $100, and $1,000 penalties to $11, $110, and 
$1,100, respectively. In other words, after an initial adjustment of $10, $100, and 
$1,000 penalties to $11, $110, and $1,100, the Act froze these new penalties in 
place until enough inflation had accumulated to warrant a subsequent increase 
of $10, $100, and $1,000, respectively, in these three penalties, respectively, to 
$21, $210, and $2,100. The triggering amount of inflation in each scenario would 
be half of $10, $100, or $1,000—namely, $5, $50, and $500. For a further expla-
nation of the impact of section 6’s rounding provisions, see Part II.C of the 
Mathematical Appendix. 
 
D. Regulatory Self-Help 
 
All of these practical irregularities in the statutory scheme for adjusting fed-
eral civil monetary penalties for changes in inflation—an incurable inflation 
gap traceable to the initial 10% cap, CPI lag that grows with each adjustment, 
and baroque and frequently absurd rounding provisions—have led or misled 
federal administrative agencies into a variety of departures from the strict letter 
of the Inflation Adjustment Act and its 1996 amendments. Anomalies traceable 
to the Inflation Adjustment Act’s rounding provisions are so absurd that the 
 122. Inflation Adjustment Act § 5(a), 104 Stat. at 891. 
 123. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (2012). 
 124. Sprinkle v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 421, 429 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 125. See 2003 GAO Report, supra note 14, at 29-31 (especially tbl. 3 & fig. 6). 
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Farm Credit Administration and the Department of Commerce have mistaken-
ly interpreted the statute in a common-sense way and performed rounding ac-
cording to the size of the increase.126 These agencies both appear to have taken 
matters into their own hands by adopting and applying their own, arguably 
more sensible interpretation of the Inflation Adjustment Act.127 
Although this sort of administrative self-help is understandable, it is con-
trary to the letter of the Inflation Adjustment Act. After all, “[i]f the intent of 
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for . . . the agency,” no less than 
a reviewing court, “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.”128 “While [courts] will not allow a literal reading of a statute to pro-
duce a result ‘demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters,’” with re-
spect to filing deadlines, dates, and other concrete numbers, “a literal reading of 
Congress’ words is generally the only proper reading.”129 
More routinely, agencies have failed to uphold the schedule for inflation 
adjustments prescribed by the 1996 amendments. The Debt Collection Im-
provement Act of 1996 directed each covered agency to perform its first infla-
tion adjustments on October 23, 1996, and to perform subsequent adjustments 
“at least once every 4 years thereafter.”130 Many failures to abide by this schedule 
are nearly impossible to detect, inasmuch as agencies are not required to pro-
vide step-by-step details of the inflation adjustment calculations. Indeed, even 
the cost of publishing notices in the Federal Register provides a disincentive 
against comprehensive methodological explanations. 
Even when an agency does describe its inflation adjustment methodology in 
detail, the simple act of complying with the 1996 amendments’ four-year time-
table often eludes the agency. For example, in 2010, NHTSA took pains to ex-
plain its inflation adjustment methodology and to apply that methodology to a 
wide range of maximum penalties.131 Without apology or other explanation, 
however, NHTSA admitted that it had waited six years (from 2004 to 2010) to 
 126. See Letter from Victor S. Rezendes, Managing Dir., Strategic Issues, Office of the 
Compt. Gen., to Hon. Michael M. Reyna, Chairman of the Bd. & Chief Exec. 
Office of Farm Credit Admin. (Sept. 24, 2002) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy 
Review); Letter from Victor S. Rezendes, Managing Dir., Strategic Issues, Office of 
the Compt. Gen., to Hon. Donald L. Evans, Sec’y of Commerce (Sept. 24, 2002) 
(on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review). 
 127. See Rules of Practice and Procedure; Adjusting Civil Money Penalties for Inflation, 
74 Fed. Reg. 2340 (Jan. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 622); Civil 
Monetary Penalties; Adjustment for Inflation, 73 Fed. Reg. 75,321 (Dec. 11, 2008) 
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 6). 
 128. Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
 129. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93 (1985) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic 
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). 
 130. Act of Apr. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, ch. 8, § 31001(s)(1)(A), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-
358 to 1321-373. 
 131. See Civil Penalties, 75 Fed. Reg. 5244, 5245-47 (Feb. 2, 2010). 
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adjust penalties for “a related series of violations of bumper standards and of 
consumer information regarding crashworthiness and damage susceptibility.”132 
Quite often, an agency’s failure to perform adjustments on the legally pre-
scribed timetable bars the agency from being able to capture all intervening in-
flation (net of the one-year CPI lag that accompanies any adjustment). For in-
stance, in 2012, the Department of Education attempted to adjust “a penalty of 
up to $1,000 for an educational organization’s failure to disclose certain infor-
mation to minor students and their parents.”133 Because that penalty had not 
been adjusted since it was established in 1994, the Department was faced with 
the prospect of adjusting the $1,000 ceiling to reflect inflation from 1994 to 2011. 
Since this was the Department’s first adjustment of this penalty, however, the 
Debt Collection Improvement Act’s 10% cap applied.134 The Inflation Adjust-
ment Act evidently did not contemplate the possibility that agencies would miss 
their statutory inflation adjustment deadlines. Retroactively applying the 10% 
cap to adjustments that should have been made, on schedule, may seem as sen-
sible as applying the Act’s rounding provisions according to the size of the in-
crease rather than the amount of a penalty, but both of these maneuvers would 
squarely contradict the language of the statute and therefore would be unlawful. 
Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security admitted in 2011 that it 
had not adjusted a penalty for noncompliance with section 231(g) of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Act (which imposes manifest requirements on 
commercial vessels and aircraft arriving in or departing from the United States), 
which penalty had been “set by legislation in 2002.”135 Again, any adjustment 
designed to capture all of the intervening years of inflation fell victim to the 10% 
cap. 
The interaction of missed deadlines, the 10% cap, and the Inflation Adjust-
ment Act’s rounding rules played special havoc with the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA). In 2009, FEMA admitted that its $5,000 penalty 
for any knowing violation of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emer-
gency Assistance Act, which had been established in 1990,136 had never been ad-
justed, notwithstanding the October 23, 1996, deadline for making initial infla-
tion adjustments.137 FEMA acknowledged that its default, coupled with the 
Inflation Adjustment Act and its 1996 amendments, precluded the agency from 
 132. Id. at 5245. 
 133. Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties for Inflation, 77 Fed. Reg. 60,047, 60,048 
(Oct. 2, 2012). 
 134. See id. 
 135. Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment, 76 Fed. Reg. 74,625, 74,626 (Dec. 1, 
2011). 
 136. See 55 Fed. Reg. 2288 (Jan. 23, 1990) (codified at 44 C.F.R. § 206.14(d)). 
 137. See Criminal and Civil Penalties Under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 58,849, 58,849 (Nov. 16, 2009). 
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fully accounting for the dramatic increase in consumer prices during the inter-
vening decades: 
 
Since the [1990] promulgation of 44 CFR 206.14(d), the CPI has in-
creased by nearly 80 percent. However, [since] this rule is FEMA’s first 
adjustment of its civil penalty regulations since the passage of the Ad-
justment Act . . . [t]he first increase may not exceed 10 percent of the 
original penalty amount.138 
 
Thereupon FEMA adjusted the penalty to $5,500. But even that decision vi-
olated the strict letter of the Inflation Adjustment Act. Section 5(a)(3), one of 
the Act’s rounding provisions, commands that “[a]ny increase” reflecting a ris-
en cost of living “be rounded to the nearest . . . multiple of $1,000 in the case of 
penalties greater than $1,000 but less than or equal to $10,000.”139 Depending on 
its admittedly contestable interpretation of “the nearest multiple of $1,000,” 
FEMA could either have adjusted this penalty to $6,000 (rounding up) or kept 
the penalty unchanged at $5,000 (rounding down). The one unlawful outcome 
was a penalty of $5,500, which could only be described as an attempt to round 
according to the size of the increase rather than the size of the penalty. 
The Department of Agriculture (USDA) provides a study in contrast. In 
2010, USDA identified a $1,200 Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act penal-
ty that would have qualified for a 10% increase under the 10% cap imposed by 
the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996.140 But the resulting $120 increase 
had to be rounded to zero under section 5(a)(3) of the Inflation Adjustment 
Act, which requires that any cost-of-living increase “be rounded to the near-
est . . . multiple of $1,000 in the case of penalties greater than $1,000 but less 
than or equal to $10,000.”141 
Indeed, USDA has proved uniquely sensitive to the effects of the Inflation 
Adjustment Act’s rounding rules. Compared to many other agencies, USDA is-
sued its initial round of inflation adjustments on July 31, 1997, merely nine 
months after the 1996 amendments’ original deadline.142 USDA announced that 
“[t]he rule contained in this notice reflects the initial adjustment . . . required 
by the Act.”143 In subsequent inflation adjustment rules, USDA has announced 
its position that the publication of a penalty amount in the Federal Register, 
even if rounding rules preclude change in that amount, constitutes the adjust-
ment of a penalty for inflation in accordance with the Act: 
 138. Id. 
 139. Inflation Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 101-410, § 5(a)(3), 104 Stat. 890, 891 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2461 note (2012)). 
 140. See Civil Monetary Penalties Adjustment, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,555, 17,556 (Apr. 7, 2010). 
 141. Inflation Adjustment Act § 5(a)(3). 
 142. See Civil Monetary Penalties Adjustment, 62 Fed. Reg. 40,924 (July 31, 1997). 
 143. Id. at 40,924. 
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USDA continues to interpret the Act such that all listed civil monetary 
penalties undergo the required adjustment whenever USDA adjusts 
those civil monetary penalties by regulation pursuant to the Act and 
publishes the regulation in the Federal Register. In other words, the 
civil monetary penalty is considered to have been adjusted even though 
the dollar amount of the penalty does not increase (a situation that 
arises due to application of the rounding formulas in section 5(a) of the 
Act). . . USDA believes that this interpretation most accurately reflects 
the plain language of the statutory text.144 
 
Another dramatic example of these statutory anomalies in action can be 
seen in the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) attempt to adjust a host 
of penalties for violations of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA).145 
These penalties relate to a number of serious violations of the INA, including: 
non-compliance with departure manifest requirements for vessels and aircraft, 
non-compliance with landing requirements at entry points by aircraft trans-
porting aliens, failure to depart the U.S. voluntarily, failure to comply with re-
moval orders or to remove alien stowaways, failure to report an illegal landing 
or desertion of an alien crewman or passenger, use of an alien crewmen for 
longshore work, employment of aliens with certain disabilities as crewmen, 
failure to control alien crewmen, bringing alien crewmen into the U.S. with the 
intent to evade the INA, failure to prevent the unauthorized landing of aliens, 
bringing aliens into the U.S. who are subject to denial on a health-related 
ground or who lack required documents, as well as general penalties for failure 
to depart or improper entry.146 The following table illustrates the impact of the 
Inflation Adjustment Act on a wide variety of penalties that DHS imposes in its 
enforcement of the INA: 
 144. Civil Monetary Penalties Adjustment, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,555, 17,555 (Apr. 7, 2010); 
Civil Monetary Penalties Adjustment, 70 Fed. Reg. 29,573, 29,573 (May 24, 2005). 
 145. See Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment, 76 Fed. Reg. 74,625, 74,627-28 
(Dec. 1, 2011). 
 146. See id. 
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Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Naturalization Act 
Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment (2011)147 
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 147. This table presents a subset of four penalties from the table of penalty adjustments 
contained in the 2011 Federal Register notice from the Department of Homeland 
Security, together with an additional column ([J], denoted by a *). See id. 
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IV. Possible Solutions 
 
All three of the significant defects in the amended Inflation Adjustment 
Act—the inflation gap, CPI lag, and rounding constraints—arise from the plain 
language of the statute. Although some agencies have tried to work around this 
statute’s most awkward provisions, those efforts are contrary to law. To be sure, 
the norms of statutory construction instruct courts and agencies alike not to in-
terpret statutes so as to achieve absurd results.148 Congress, however, ultimately 
chose unambiguous language to achieve dubious results. Clear statutory lan-
guage puts an end to an agency’s interpretive discretion, for “the agency[] must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”149 Congression-
al designation of concrete numbers “with respect to filing deadlines” and other 
dates leaves no room for any “proper reading” besides “a literal reading of Con-
gress’ words.”150 Since step one of so-called Chevron analysis leaves no room for 
imaginative administrative interpretation,151 any reform addressing the failures 
of the Inflation Adjustment Act must emerge from Congress itself. I recom-
mend possible legislative solutions to the major problems afflicting the Inflation 
Adjustment Act. 
 
A. Possible Legislative Amendments 
 
1. Inflation Gap 
 
The simplest solution to the inflation gap rests in outright repeal of the 10% 
cap on initial inflation adjustments found in section 6. Until the 1996 amend-
ment, no member of Congress or witness at a congressional hearing had pro-
posed any cap more stringent than 1000%. In fairness, the 10% cap may be ra-
tionalized, especially in hindsight, as part of a larger legislative package. The 
 148. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992); Green v. Bock Laundry 
Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1989); id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982); United 
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT 
RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 148 (2008); Veronica M. 
Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defending the Absurd Result 
Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U.L. REV. 127 (1994). 
 149. Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
 150. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93 (1985). 
 151. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 
(2005) (describing “Chevron step one” as a “demanding . . . standard” under which 
a textually clear “statute unambiguously forecloses” agency discretion and leaves 
“no gap for [an] agency to fill”); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater 
Horizon,” 2015 A.M.C. 758, 763, 2015 WL 729701, at *6 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2015) 
(“The Inflation Adjustment Act . . . provided a detailed formula for calculating . . . 
adjustments. Thus, the EPA had no discretion—it was required by Congress to 
adjust the penalty according to the formula.”). 
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1996 amendment introduced an automatic adjustment mechanism that had 
proved quite controversial in the debates preceding passage of the original In-
flation Adjustment Act in 1990. Indeed, the original 1990 statute reverted to a 
presidential reporting mechanism that left the actual legal work of adjusting 
civil monetary penalties to Congress, in the form of full-blown legislation. The 
1996 amendment, seen in this light, may have conditioned congressional acqui-
escence in an automatic adjustment mechanism upon the imposition of a re-
strictive cap on initial adjustments. 
The legislative history of the Inflation Adjustment Act reflects Congress’s 
evident concern that no single adjustment for inflation exceed 10%, lest the pub-
lic be shocked or even unduly inconvenienced by a large, one-time increase in 
civil monetary penalties. Retaining the 10% limit solely as a cap on any cost-of-
living adjustment made in any single year allows Congress to keep some limit 
on inflation-based increases. By the same token, allowing a 10% increase in any 
given year does supply a slow cure for the inflation gap that cripples the existing 
Inflation Adjustment Act. If we assume modest inflation, somewhere in the 
neighborhood of the historical average of 2.5%, annual 10% increases would en-
able agencies eventually to align civil monetary penalties with the inflation that 
has intervened since the original passage of the statute imposing those penalties. 
As demonstrated in Part II.D of the Mathematical Appendix, agencies op-
erating under a 10% cap on annual cost-of-living increases can close the histori-
cal inflation gap within 0.35 times the number of years that a civil penalty lan-
guished without an inflation adjustment, assuming that inflation remains at its 
historical average of 2.5%. (The Mathematical Appendix provides further details 
on the impact of relaxing assumptions about constant levels of inflation or 
about the equivalence of past and future inflation.) If Congress, in amending 
the Act, sought to soften the initial implementation of inflation adjustments for 
civil monetary penalties that have lain dormant, this ratio would facilitate a rea-
sonably informed estimate of the time that it will take for a phased-in set of in-
flation adjustments, each observing a fixed cap on annual increases, to catch up 
for lost intervening time and take full effect. 
Some danger remains if Congress chooses to limit annual inflation adjust-
ments to 10% in the interest of softening the transition from long-neglected civil 
penalties. Contrary to the simplifying assumption adopted hitherto by this Arti-
cle, I will no longer assume that inflation increases at a constant annual rate of 
2.5%. Rather, I will use actual historical CPI data. Since 1914, the CPI has in-
creased more than 10% in a single year on ten occasions.152 This represents an 
incidence just over 10% (ten occasions divided by ninety-eight years ≈ 10.2%). 
The past two decades have witnessed remarkable stability in consumer prices. 
The CPI has not increased by more than 4% in any year since 1992. Of the ten 
years since 1914 that witnessed annual inflation of 10% or more, seven (1917 
through 1920, plus 1979 through 1981) took place in streaks of three or four 
 152. Consumer Price Index: All Urban Consumers - (CPI-U), BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpifiles/cpiai.txt. These figures 
are reported in Part I.C of the Mathematical Appendix. 
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years. Any meaningful ceiling on initial or intermittent adjustments is therefore 
vulnerable to a mismatch between statutory design and economic realities. 
 
2. CPI Lag 
 
CPI lag is likely the product of poor legislative drafting. The Act’s reference 
to “the Consumer Price Index for the month of June of the calendar year pre-
ceding the adjustment” appears to have arisen from a linguistically decisive but 
pragmatically troubling resolution of ambiguous language in Senator Lauten-
berg’s original bills.153 The plain meaning of this provision systematically directs 
federal agencies to ignore six to eighteen months of CPI data as they make cost-
of-living adjustments in civil monetary penalties. If Congress wishes to retain 
current law’s reliance on CPI data for the month of June, it can do so by rewrit-
ing section 5(b)(2) so that it refers to “the Consumer Price Index for the most 
recent month of June.” 
CPI lag is an artifact of the Inflation Adjustment Act’s requirement that 
agencies performing inflation-based adjustments in civil monetary penalties 
apply CPI data for the “calendar year preceding the adjustment.” Parallel lan-
guage in the Internal Revenue Code, however, demonstrates that it is possible 
for a statute to prescribe inflation-based adjustments based on CPI data from a 
“preceding calendar year” without forcing each round of adjustments to ignore 
an entire year of inflation. Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code154 is the pro-
vision that gives federal income taxation its generally progressive nature by pre-
scribing brackets of increasingly higher marginal rates.155 Generally speaking, 
the structure of income tax rates is the place where inflation has its greatest im-
pact on income taxation.156 The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 added par-
agraph (f) to I.R.C. Section 1 in order to index tax brackets for inflation.157 In 
the absence of indexing, progressive tax brackets “creep” on taxpayers as infla-
tion shoves them into higher brackets. Inflation creep had become especially 
acute in the years immediately preceding the 1981 tax reform.158 Because many 
 153. Inflation Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 101-410, § 5(b)(1), 104 Stat. 890, 892 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2461 note (2012)). 
 154. I.R.C. § 1(a)-(e) (2012) (West 2014). 
 155. See Jim Chen, Progressive Taxation: An Aesthetic and Moral Defense, 50 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 659, 662 (2012). 
 156. See Jim Chen, The Price of Macroeconomic Imprecision: How Should the Law 
Measure Inflation?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1375, 1386-88 (2003) [hereinafter Chen, The 
Price of Macroeconomic Imprecision]. See generally James Ming Chen, Indexing 
Inflation: The Impact of Methodology on Econometrics and Macroeconomic Policy, 1 
CENT. BANK J.L. & FIN. 3 (2014) [hereinafter Chen, Indexing Inflation]. 
 157. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, tit. I, § 104(a), 95 Stat. 
172, 188. 
 158. See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez, The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Income: A Panel 
Study of “Bracket Creep,” 87 J. PUB. ECON. 1231, 1233 (2003). 
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other aspects of federal income taxation are based on section 1(f)’s definition of 
the cost of living,159 this provision’s approach to inflation indexing has a pro-
found impact on the entire Internal Revenue Code. 
As amended in 1981, section 1(f) adjusts federal income tax brackets for in-
creases in the cost of living. Subsections (3) and (4) refer to CPI data for a “pre-
ceding year”: 
 
(3) Cost-of-living adjustment 
For purposes of paragraph (2), the cost-of-living adjustment for any 
calendar year is the percentage (if any) by which— 
 (A) the CPI for the preceding calendar year, exceeds 
 (B) the CPI for the calendar year 1992. 
(4) CPI for any calendar year 
For purposes of paragraph (3), the CPI for any calendar year is the av-
erage of the Consumer Price Index as of the close of the 12-month pe-
riod ending on August 31 of such calendar year.160 
 
On the surface, the language of section 1(f)(3) and (4) parallels that of sec-
tion 5(b) of the Inflation Adjustment Act. Although the legislative history of the 
Inflation Adjustment Act provides no evidence that the drafters of this statute 
relied upon section 1(f) of the Internal Revenue Code, it is almost certain that 
members of the 100th and 101st Congresses were aware of that provision. After 
its introduction in 1981, inflation indexing of the Internal Revenue Code be-
came a distinctive feature of federal income taxation. At a minimum, even if the 
architects of the Inflation Adjustment Act paid no direct heed to section 1(f) of 
the Internal Revenue Code, section 5(b) of the Inflation Adjustment Act and 
section 1(f) of the Internal Revenue Code are statutes in pari materia, meant to 
be read together.161 Interpretive inferences drawn from the Internal Revenue 
Code may therefore shed light on the Inflation Adjustment Act, and vice versa. 
To see how the Internal Revenue Code might serve as a drafting model for 
revisions of the Inflation Adjustment Act, consider the Code’s handling of CPI 
adjustments. Section 1(f)’s reference to the CPI for a “preceding calendar year” 
refers unambiguously to cost-of-living data from the year immediately prior to 
the year in which a CPI inquiry is made. The current version of section 1(f) 
treats CPI for 1992 as the cost-of-living baseline for tax year 1993.162 If tax brack-
ets for 1993 begin with the baseline of CPI as of August 1992, then inflation-
adjusted tax brackets for a subsequent year must track the growth in CPI from 
 159. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 63(c)(4)(B) (West 2014) (standard deduction). 
 160. I.R.C. § 1(f)(3)-(4) (West 2014). 
 161. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1940); United States v. 
Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 564-65 (1845). 
 162. I.R.C. § 1(f)(3)(B) (West 2014). 
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August 1992 to August of the year prior to the targeted tax year. For instance, 
brackets for tax year 2000 must have been based on CPI data for 1999. 
The use of CPI data by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) confirms this in-
terpretation of section 1(f). As of 2000, the relevant date for purposes of exam-
ining how the Internal Revenue Service used CPI data to calculate inflation 
from 1999 to 2000 in keeping with section 1(f) of the Internal Revenue Code, 
federal income tax retained the basic bracket structure that had been established 
in 1993. For single taxpayers who were not heads of households, income above 
the zero-bracket level but below $22,100 was taxed in 1993 at 15%.163 For tax year 
2000, single taxpayers paid a marginal rate of 15% on all income between $0 and 
$26,250, net of the personal exemption and of all deductions.164 The ratio of 
$26,250 to $22,100 is approximately 1.188. 
Close examination of CPI data demonstrates that the IRS, in readjusting in-
come tax brackets in 2000, used CPI data for 1999. This is precisely what section 
1(f)(3) of the Code meant by the “preceding year.” Historical tables for CPI re-






The ratio between CPI for 1999 and CPI for 1992, vis-à-vis the ratio between 
CPI for 2000 and CPI for 1992, makes clear that the IRS applied the 1999 CPI 
figure: 
 
CPI1999/CPI1992:167.1/140.9 ≈ 1.186 
CPI2000/CPI1992:172.8/140.9 ≈ 1.226 
 
Use of CPI data for a “preceding year” makes affirmative sense in the con-
text of federal income taxation. To define tax brackets for 2000, the IRS was re-
quired to determine the CPI adjustment “not later than December 15” of 
1999.166 As of December 15, 1999, the IRS obviously could not have projected 
CPI levels in August 2000.167 The IRS continues to adjust bracket boundaries on 
this basis, prescribing bracket boundaries for the coming tax year in the final 
months of the “preceding year.” 
 163. See id. § 1(c). 
 164. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2000 TAX RATE SCHEDULES 71 (2000), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i1040tt--2000.pdf. 
 165. See supra note 152. 
 166. See I.R.C. § 1(f)(1) (West 2014). 
 167. See id. § 1(f)(4) (defining the CPI for any year by reference to the 12-month 
average ending in August of that year). 
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By contrast, section 5(b) of the Inflation Adjustment Act incorporates an it-
eratively compounding form of inflation lag that I.R.C. § 1(f) appropriately 
avoids. The Inflation Adjustment Act directs federal agencies to calculate 
 
the percentage (if any) for each civil monetary penalty by which—(1) 
the Consumer Price index for the month of June of the calendar year 
preceding the adjustment, exceeds (2) the Consumer Price Index for 
the month of June of the calendar year in which the amount of such 
civil monetary penalty was last set or adjusted pursuant to law.168 
 
If Congress had wanted to structure section 5(b) of the Inflation Adjustment 
Act precisely in parallel with I.R.C. § 1(f), it would have been better served to 
write the following (altered language in italics): 
 
the percentage (if any) for each civil monetary penalty by which—(1) 
the Consumer Price index for the month of June of the calendar year 
preceding the adjustment, exceeds (2) the Consumer Price Index for 
the month of June of the calendar year preceding the calendar year in 
which the amount of such civil monetary penalty was last set or adjust-
ed pursuant to law. 
 
The current version of section 1(f) of the Internal Revenue Code effectively ac-
complishes this mission by starting with a baseline of 1993 tax brackets based on 
1992 CPI figures. 
Remarkably enough, an even better legislative model appears in the Debt 
Collection Improvement Act of 1996, the omnibus budget bill that amended the 
Inflation Adjustment Act in 1996. A different subsection of section 31001 of the 
Debt Collection Improvement Act (the very provision that amended the Infla-
tion Adjustment Act) amended 31 U.S.C. § 3717 to enable “the head of an execu-
tive, judicial, or legislative agency [to] increase an administrative claim by the 
cost of living adjustment in lieu of charging interest and penalties.”169 The “cost 
of living adjustment” for this statute is defined as “the percentage by which the 
Consumer Price Index for the month of June of the calendar year preceding the 
adjustment exceeds the Consumer Price Index for the month of the June of the 
calendar year in which the claim was determined or last adjusted.”170 A crisper 





 168.  Inflation Adjustment Act § 5(b).  
 169. Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 31001(q), 101 Stat. 1321, 1321-358 (1996) (adding 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3717(i)(1)). 
 170. Id. (adding 31 U.S.C. § 3717(i)(2)(A)). 
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3. Rounding 
 
Rounding has confounded the Inflation Adjustment Act ever since Senator 
Lautenberg invited his congressional colleagues to modify his original proposal 
of rounding all increases to the nearest multiple of $10. Perhaps the time has 
come to restore the original bill’s $10 rounding provision. Alternatively, as some 
agencies and the GAO have suggested, Congress may wish to consider repealing 
the rounding provision in its entirety.171 
A less drastic alternative lies in amending the Inflation Adjustment Act so 
that rounding is based solely on the size of the increase rather than the size of 
the underlying penalty. Section 5(a) of the Act reads in part: “Any increase de-
termined under this subsection shall be rounded to the nearest—(1) multiple of 
$10 in the case of penalties less than or equal to $100; (2) multiple of $100 in the 
case of penalties greater than $100 but less than or equal to $1,000”172 Substitut-
ing the word “increases” for the word “penalties” yields this alternative: “Any 
increase determined under this subsection shall be rounded to the nearest—(1) 
multiple of $10 in the case of penalties increases less than or equal to $100; (2) 
multiple of $100 in the case of penalties increases greater than $100 but less than 
or equal to $1,000.” Rounding adjustments according to the level of the increas-
es rather than the level of the penalties will ameliorate two of the deleterious ef-
fects of the Inflation Adjustment Act. The Act’s rounding provisions, as they 
stand, make adjustments less frequent (in partial contravention of congression-
al intent) and more volatile when they do occur (in complete frustration of 
Congress’s expectations and of any plausible legislative purpose underlying a 
statutory directive to adjust monetary penalties for inflation). Rounding ac-
cording to increases rather than entire penalties will facilitate more frequent (or 
at least more regular) adjustments, and with far less “whiplash” than under ex-
isting law. 
Section 1(f) of the Internal Revenue Code, whose referral to CPI data from 
a “preceding year” provides in pari materia evidence for interpreting parallel 
language in section 5(b) of the Inflation Adjustment Act, offers a model for 
amending the Inflation Adjustment Act’s rounding provisions. Under section 
1(f)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code, cost-of-living adjustments are “rounded 
to the next lowest multiple of $50” (or, in the case of married individuals filing 
separate returns, “the next lowest multiple of $25”): 
 
(6) Rounding 
 (A) In general 
 If any increase determined under paragraph (2)(A), section 63 
(c)(4), section 68(b)(2) or section 151 (d)(4) is not a multiple of $50, 
such increase shall be rounded to the next lowest multiple of $50. 
 171. See 2003 GAO Report, supra note 14, at 33, 38. 
 172. Inflation Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 101-410, § 5(a)(1)-(2), 104 Stat. 890, 891 
(1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2461 note (2012)). 
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 (B) Table for married individuals filing separately 
 In the case of a married individual filing a separate return, subpar-
agraph (A) (other than with respect to sections 63 (c)(4) and 151 
(d)(4)(A)) shall be applied by substituting “$25” for “$50” each place it 
appears.173 
 
Relative to the Inflation Adjustment Act’s debilitating methodology, the In-
ternal Revenue Code’s approach to rounding offers two virtues. First, it rounds 
according to the size of an increase rather than the size of the penalty. Second, 
the Code uses a simple, round number—$50—for most rounding purposes, 
with the logically sound exception of splitting $50 into two halves of $25 for 
married taxpayers filing separately. 
 
B. Exploiting Institutional Diversity Within the Federal Government 
 
If Congress does reexamine the Inflation Adjustment Act, it should take 
advantage of institutional diversity within the U.S. government. The Inflation 
Adjustment Act exempted four statutes: the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, the 
Tariff Act of 1930, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, and the So-
cial Security Act.174 Although the precise reasoning behind these exemptions has 
always remained obscure, the exemptions stand. Consequently, they (and the 
agencies exempted) might as well be enlisted in service of legislative rationality. 
The agencies exempted from the Inflation Adjustment Act are not strangers 
to the exercise of adjusting civil monetary penalties for changes in inflation. In-
deed, the Department of Labor, where the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration resides, is responsible for calculating and reporting the CPI 
through its Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). For their part, the IRS and the So-
cial Security Administration are among the federal government’s most vora-
cious “consumers” of CPI data.175 These agencies have extensive familiarity with 
the CPI as the federal government’s preferred measure of inflation. 
Agencies responsible for the statutes exempted from the Inflation Adjust-
ment Act have had their own experiences, positive and negative, in implement-
ing their own inflation adjustments free from the constraints of the Inflation 
Adjustment Act. The record of the IRS is especially instructive.176 Some tax pen-
alties automatically adjust for inflation because they are based on a percentage 
of the taxpayer’s overall liability. For example, the penalty for failure to pay tax 
 173. I.R.C. § 1(f)(6) (West 2014). 
 174. See id. § 4(1). 
 175. See generally Chen, The Price of Macroeconomic Imprecision, supra note 156. 
 176. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1062 TAX COMPLIANCE: 
INFLATION HAS SIGNIFICANTLY DECREASED THE VALUE OF SOME PENALTIES (Aug. 
2007) [hereinafter 2007 GAO Report]; Michael C. Durst, Inflation and the Tax 
Code: Guidelines for Policymaking, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1217 (1989). 
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obligations is “0.5 percent of the amount of such tax if the failure is for not 
more than 1 month, with an additional 0.5 percent for each additional month or 
fraction thereof during which such failure continues, not exceeding 25 percent 
in the aggregate.”177 Penalties of this sort automatically adjust in response to in-
flation. But the Internal Revenue Code is also filled with civil penalties based on 
a fixed dollar amount. For instance, the penalty for failure to file a partnership 
return “is the product of $195, multiplied by the number of” partners.178 Like 
penalties covered by the Inflation Adjustment Act, those penalties are vulnera-
ble to erosion due to inflation over time. 
If any federal agency is uniquely, appropriately equipped to adjust civil 
monetary penalties to reflect inflation and to ensure that deterrent effects re-
main robust despite changes in consumer prices and the broader economy, that 
agency is the IRS. The IRS is familiar with the use of CPI to adjust many parts of 
the Internal Revenue Code.179 The Code uses the CPI to adjust tax brackets,180 
the standard deduction,181 the personal exemption,182 and itemized deductions 
such as Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits.183 
To be sure, the IRS’s institutional capacity should not be equated with ac-
tual institutional performance. The IRS has not implemented inflation-based 
adjustments to civil penalties within the Internal Revenue Code.184 The result is 
a considerable loss of revenue to the Treasury and a corresponding dilution of 
the effectiveness of fixed-amount civil monetary penalties in federal income tax 
law. At first glance, this record of institutional performance hardly serves to 
recommend the IRS as the agency of first resort if Congress were to tap the la-
tent expertise of the federal government in developing and implementing effec-
tive inflation-based adjustments of civil monetary penalties. The truth remains, 
though, that dollar-denominated penalties under the Internal Revenue Code 
serve the same legislative purposes as their counterparts throughout the rest of 
the federal government: to deter conduct targeted by civil monetary penalties 
and, perhaps secondarily, to raise revenue for the United States. The pervasive-
ness of statutory references to the CPI within the Internal Revenue Code and 
the overall impact of inflation on income taxation should enable the IRS, under 
appropriate congressional authorization, to supply helpful guidance to other 
federal agencies. 
 177. I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2) (West 2014). 
 178. I.R.C. § 6698(b) (West 2014). 
 179. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Serv., IR-2011-104, In 2012, Many Tax Benefits Increase 
Due to Inflation Adjustments (Oct. 20, 2011), https://www.irs.gov/uac/In-2012,-
Many-Tax-Benefits-Increase-Due-to-Inflation-Adjustments. 
 180. I.R.C. § 1(f)(3) (West 2014). 
 181. I.R.C. § 63(c)(4) (West 2014). 
 182. I.R.C. § 151(d)(4) (West 2014). 
 183. I.R.C. § 25A(h) (West 2014). 
 184. See 2007 GAO Report, supra note 176, at 3-4. 
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Finally, if Congress amends the Inflation Adjustment Act, it may wish to 
consider designating a single agency to guide other agencies in applying the Act 
or (in the case of exempt statutes) in fashioning inflation adjustments not sub-
ject to the Act. The BLS in the Department of Labor develops and updates the 
CPI. The IRS in the Department of Treasury has more experience applying the 
CPI than perhaps any other agency. Each of these agencies is responsible for en-
forcing one statute exempted from the Inflation Adjustment Act. Either the BLS 
or the IRS would be capable of providing guidance to the rest of the federal 
government on performing inflation-based adjustments in civil monetary pen-
alties. The BLS should receive primary consideration for this coordinating role, 
if only because placing responsibility for this function outside the IRS would 
reinforce the primary function of civil monetary penalties as deterrence-driven 
tools for implementing administrative law over these penalties’ secondary func-
tion as sources of revenue. 
It bears remembering, however, that no agencies answered an earlier call 
for coordinated oversight of inflation adjustments within the federal govern-
ment. In response to the 2003 GAO report, both the Commissioner of Financial 
Management Services within the Department of the Treasury and the staff of 
the OMB took pains to emphasize that some agency other than their own 
should undertake the “central oversight and guidance function . . . needed to 
ensure consistency in” the interpretation and application of the Inflation Ad-
justment Act.185 
 
C. The Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015 
 
As this Article neared the conclusion of the editorial process, Congress 
passed the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act 
of 2015 as section 701 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015.186 The Improvements 
Act implements many of the suggestions described in this Article and in Rec-
ommendation 2012-8 of the Administrative Conference of the United States. 
The Improvements Act has greatly simplified the calculation of cost-of-living 
adjustments under the Inflation Adjustment Act. The most significant modifi-
cation of the Act’s CPI methodology directs all prospective annual adjustments 
to be made according to the amount by which “the Consumer Price Index for 
the month of October preceding the date of the adjustment exceeds . . . the 
Consumer Price Index for the month of October” in the previous year.187 The 
Improvements Act also simplifies all rounding under the Inflation Adjustment 
Act “to the nearest multiple of $1.”188 The former modification eliminates the 
 185. 2003 GAO Report, supra note 14, at 39-40. The quoted language is in reference to 
the response of the Commissioner of Financial Management Services to the GAO 
Report, but also describes the OMB’s response. 
 186. See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, § 701, 129 Stat. 584, 599. 
 187. Id. § 701(b)(2)(B). 
 188. Id. § 701(b)(2)(A). 
 41 
 
Chen Article FINALPROD.doc (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2016 4:29 PM 
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 34 : 1 2015 
CPI lag problem; the latter eliminates anomalies associated with the baroque 
rounding provisions of the Inflation Adjustment Act as it stood before 2015. 
The Improvements Act has ameliorated but not eliminated the “inflation 
gap” problem that plagued the pre-2015 version of the Inflation Adjustment 
Act. In anticipation of future adjustments, the Improvements Act has directed 
initial adjustments based on the increase in the CPI for October 2015 relative to 
the CPI “for the month of October of the calendar year during which the 
amount of [the relevant] civil monetary penalty was established or adjusted un-
der a provision of law other than” the Improvements Act.189 “The amount of 
the increase in a civil monetary penalty” subject to this initial adjustment, how-
ever, “shall not exceed 150 percent of the amount of that civil monetary penalty” 
on the Improvement Act’s date of enactment.190 At the same time, the Im-
provements Act has repealed that portion of the 1996 amendment that was re-
sponsible for imposing a 10% cap on initial inflation adjustments. 
In short, some sort of cap on initial inflation adjustment remains, but it has 
increased from 10% to 150% of the penalty. Because the amended Act leaves a 
cap in place, an inflation gap theoretically could emerge in the unlikely event 
that an initial inflation adjustment would increase an existing civil monetary 
penalty by an amount exceeding 150% of the penalty’s current level. Under the 
simplifying assumption that inflation increases every year at a fixed rate of 2.5%, 
an increase hitting the new 150% ceiling (tantamount to a new penalty that is 
two and a half times as large as the original penalty) implies more than 37 years 










By contrast, a mere four-year delay (ln(1.1)/(ln(1.025) ≈ 3.86) in adjusting a 
civil monetary penalty under conditions of 2.5% annual inflation would trigger 
the 10% limit imposed by the pre-2015 version of the Inflation Adjustment Act. 
Several other changes effected by the Improvements Act are similarly wor-
thy of notice. In making initial inflation adjustments prescribed by the Im-
provements Act, an agency head may make an adjustment below the level dic-
tated by the newly simplified inflation computation by issuing a final rule 
determining that “increasing the civil monetary penalty by the otherwise re-
quired amount will have a negative economic impact” or that “the social costs” 
of increasing the penalty as prescribed would “outweigh the benefits.”191 Such a 
rule must also secure the concurrence of the director of the OMB.192 Indeed, the 
 189. Id. § 701(b)(2)(B). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. § 701(b)(1)(D). 
 192. See id. 
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OMB now supervises compliance with the Inflation Adjustment Act, since the 
Improvements Act directs the OMB to “issue guidance to agencies on imple-
menting [required] inflation adjustments.”193 In turn, agencies are required to 
report information on civil monetary penalties and their adjustment to the 
OMB.194 The Comptroller General must report annually on “the compliance of 
agencies” with the Inflation Adjustment Act.195 Finally, the Improvements Act 
now subjects civil monetary penalties under the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act and the Social Security Act to the Inflation Adjustment Act.196 Penalties im-





Adjusting civil monetary penalties is indisputably sound legal policy. Nei-
ther Congress nor the executive branch has contested the goals of the Inflation 
Adjustment Act. Before its 2015 amendment, however, the language of that stat-
ute undermined the attainment of those goals. Thanks to the Inflation Adjust-
ment Act Improvements Act of 2015, Congress has effectively eliminated the 
CPI lag arising from the unamended Act’s directive that agencies ignore six to 
eighteen months of CPI data when making adjustments. The Improvement 
Act’s adoption of rounding to the nearest dollar has restored rationality to the 
statute’s rounding provisions. Although Congress has not altogether eliminated 
the inflation gap that arose from the 10% cap on initial adjustments, the new 
150% gap should minimize the instances in which such a gap will plague future 
adjustments of civil monetary penalties for inflation. The OMB and the Comp-
troller General now serve vital roles in collecting institutional information on 
inflation-based adjustments throughout the federal government. In addition, 
the BLS, as the producer of the CPI, and the IRS, as the leading governmental 
“consumer” of CPI data, may supply valuable institutional insights into future 
reform and implementation of inflation adjustments across the federal govern-
ment. 
Civil monetary penalties are more than a source of revenue. Their proper 
calibration advances substantive regulatory policies across a wide spectrum of 
federal agencies. Monetary penalties also provide valuable alternatives to more 
draconian civil remedies (such as the suspension or revocation of licenses) or 
even criminal sanctions. The enduring link between inflation and revenue made 
it possible for Congress to amend the Inflation Adjustment Act as part of a leg-
islative compromise to postpone partisan bickering over the federal budget un-
 193. Id. § 701(b)(4). 
 194. See id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See id. § 701(b)(1)(B). 
 197. See id. 
 43 
 
Chen Article FINALPROD.doc (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2016 4:29 PM 
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 34 : 1 2015 
til the 2016 election and the installation of a new Congress and a new presiden-
tial administration. The most significant amendments to the Act before 2015, it 
bears remembering, took place in connection with an omnibus budget bill 
styled the Debt Collection Improvement Act. In an age of divided government 
and bitter partisan brinksmanship over budgets and debt ceilings, tweaking the 
process by which civil monetary penalties are adjusted for inflation has offered a 
politically palatable path toward added revenues without crossing electrified 
boundaries over taxation. In an age when even the reindexation of cost-of-
living increases for Social Security benefits lies beyond political plausibility, ra-
tional reform of the Inflation Adjustment Act offers a glimmer of hope. 
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Mathematical Appendix 
 
I. Observing and Reporting Inflation 
 
A  Inflation, Over Time and On Average 
 
Like interest on loans or savings, inflation compounds over time. Mathe-
matically, inflation over a period of time can be expressed as a multiplicative 
series of annual inflation rates: 
 
Total inflation over n years =
 





Consistent with conventional notation in the literature of macroeconomics, 
the Greek letter π represents inflation. This Article does not use π in the more 
commonplace sense as the ratio of a circle’s circumference to its diameter. In 
any given year k, πk represents the annual inflation rate. 
This Article does not dispute actual observations of the level of inflation or 
inflation-measuring methodologies. The Inflation Adjustment Act measures in-
flation according to the CPI. Although this choice among inflation indexes is 
vulnerable to attack on econometric grounds,198 the Act prescribes resort to the 
CPI.199 Since actual inflation is undisputed as a matter of law (if not as a matter 
of fact), one way to simply analysis is to assume a constant rate of inflation that 
is consistent with historical levels and not overly optimistic or otherwise mis-
leading for purposes of projecting future inflation. This is very similar to the 
familiar problem of calculating compound interest on the assumption that in-
terest remains fixed. Total inflation over an interval from k=1 to k=n may be 
stated in terms of average annual inflation,
 
p , a term that I will now define: 
Total inflation over n years =
 




Total inflation as the compounding of π over n years: 
 
 





 198. See generally Chen, The Price of Macroeconomic Imprecision, supra note 156; Chen, 
Indexing Inflation, supra note 156. 
 199. See Inflation Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 101-410, § 5(b), 104 Stat. 890 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2461 note (2012)); McCabe v. Mais, No. 05-CV-73-LRR, 
2010 WL 3938383, at *8 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 5, 2010) (“Congress provided that civil 
monetary penalties should be adjusted for inflation and adopted the CPI as the 
method for calculating inflation.”).  
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p = (1+ p )n  
The Inflation Adjustment Act uses annual changes in CPI as its measure of 
inflation. For any given year k, ∆πk = ∆CPIk: 
 
 





Average annual inflation, 
 
p , over any given period is the geometric mean 
of this product, minus 1: 
 
Average annual inflation =
 
 





If n, the total number of years, is defined as the difference between later 
year b and earlier year a, the previous relationships can be restated in terms of 
the difference between b and a: 
 
 
n = b − a




p = (1+ p )b−a
 
 
The CPI is reported as a ratio of the price of a market basket of consumer 
goods, relative to an index of 100 for a base year. Total inflation over that period 






where CPIa refers to CPI in the earlier base year a and CPIb refers to CPI in 
the later target year b. Average annual inflation is the geometric mean of this 








B. Estimating Annual Inflation 
 
Computing a geometric mean is not an intuitive mathematical operation. 
Casual estimates of annual inflation based on the ratio of CPI values for differ-
ent years routinely make the mistake of taking the ratio and dividing by the 
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number of years between the earlier and the later year. This is a valid method 
for computing an arithmetic mean, but not for computing a geometric mean. 
Although modern computing readily facilitates the calculation of exact ge-
ometric means, I wish to offer a responsive alternative to the continuing allure 
of estimating annual inflation by dividing a ratio of CPI values by the number 
of years elapsed. The natural logarithm of the ratio of CPI values for different 




p ≈ ln(CPIb /CPIa )
b − a
=
ln(CPIb ) − ln(CPIa )
b − a  
 
A worked example illustrates this shortcut. Suppose that the CPI increases 
from 100 to 150 in a period of ten years. The ratio of the ending CPI value of 150 
to the baseline value of 100 is 1.5. The all-too-common expedient of dividing 1.5 
by 10 (the number of years elapsed) reports a misleadingly high figure of 5% an-
nual inflation. The ratio of ln(1.5) to 10, however, provides a much closer esti-
mate of 4.055% annual inflation. In reality, inflation over this hypothetical peri-
od was 4.138% (the geometric mean of 1.5 over 10 years). 
Why this shortcut works warrants a brief mathematical excursion. Euler’s 
constant, e (approximately 2.718), is the base of natural logarithms. It is defined 
















Previous equations have expressed inflation over an interval of multiple 
years in the following two ways: 
 
 






The first of these equations expresses the effect of compounding an average 
annual inflation rate, 
 
p , over b − a years. The second equation expresses infla-
tion as the ratio of a later CPI figure (CPIb) to CPI for an earlier, baseline year 






Chen Article FINALPROD.doc (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2016 4:29 PM 
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 34 : 1 2015 
 
(1+ p )b−a = CPIb
CPIa








(b − a) ⋅ ln(1+ p ) = ln(CPIb ) − ln(CPIa )
ln(1+ p ) = ln(CPIb ) − ln(CPIa )
b − a
  
For small values of 
 
p , the expression ln(1+
 
p ) is a good approximation of 
 
p  itself. For example, if 
 




p )] is 
0.00497; if 
 












1− ln(1+ p )
p 
 
0.01 0.009950 0.995033 0.004967 
0.02 0.019803 0.990131 0.009869 
0.03 0.029559 0.985293 0.014707 
0.04 0.039221 0.980518 0.019482 
0.05 0.048790 0.975803 0.024197 
0.06 0.058269 0.971148 0.028852 
0.07 0.067659 0.966552 0.033448 
0.08 0.076961 0.962013 0.037987 
0.09 0.086178 0.957530 0.042470 
0.10 0.095310 0.953102 0.046898 
 
Demonstrating the relationship between ln(1+
 
p ) and 
 
p  begins with a 
modest rearrangement of our original definition of average annual inflation: 
 
 
p = (1+ p )b−a









As (b − a) increases, this quantity approaches e raised to the quantity, 
 
p (b − a) : 
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= ep ( b−a )
(1+ p )b−a ≈ ep ( b−a )
(b − a) ⋅ ln(1+ p ) ≈ p (b − a)
ln(1+ p ) ≈ p 
  
Extending the previous exercise in algebraic rearrangement to its logical 





ln(1+ p ) = ln(CPIb ) − ln(CPIa )
b − a














where the expression exp(x) indicates exponentiation, or the raising of e, Euler’s 
constant, to the power of x. 
Alternatively, inasmuch as 
 
(1+ p )b−a  is an estimate, it may be more conven-




Taking the natural logarithm of both sides and dividing by (b – a) yields the 





p ≈ ln(1+ p )  
 
For positive values of π and
 
p , the actual inflation rate falls between the 
two estimates I have proposed: 
 
 
ln(1+ p ) < p < ep −1, p > 0  
 
Ultimately, these shortcuts permit the convenient division into two steps of 
the admittedly awkward process of calculating average annual inflation: 
(1) taking the natural logarithm of the ratio of target-year CPI to base-year CPI, 
see BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 152, and (2) dividing that result by 
the number of years that have passed: 
 
 
p ≈ ln(CPIb /CPIa )
b − a
=
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This estimate may be readily converted to the exact geometric mean by ex-
ponentiation, followed by subtraction of 1: 
 
 











C. Table of Actual Inflation, 1965-2015200 
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
1965 31.2 31.2 31.3 31.4 31.4 31.6 31.6 31.6 31.6 31.7 31.7 31.8 
1966 31.8 32.0 32.1 32.3 32.3 32.4 32.5 32.7 32.7 32.9 32.9 32.9 
1967 32.9 32.9 33.0 33.1 33.2 33.3 33.4 33.5 33.6 33.7 33.8 33.9 
1968 34.1 34.2 34.3 34.4 34.5 34.7 34.9 35.0 35.1 35.3 35.4 35.5 
1969 35.6 35.8 36.1 36.3 36.4 36.6 36.8 37.0 37.1 37.3 37.5 37.7 
1970 37.8 38.0 38.2 38.5 38.6 38.8 39.0 39.0 39.2 39.4 39.6 39.8 
1971 39.8 39.9 40.0 40.1 40.3 40.6 40.7 40.8 40.8 40.9 40.9 41.1 
1972 41.1 41.3 41.4 41.5 41.6 41.7 41.9 42.0 42.1 42.3 42.4 42.5 
1973 42.6 42.9 43.3 43.6 43.9 44.2 44.3 45.1 45.2 45.6 45.9 46.2 
1974 46.6 47.2 47.8 48.0 48.6 49.0 49.4 50.0 50.6 51.1 51.5 51.9 
1975 52.1 52.5 52.7 52.9 53.2 53.6 54.2 54.3 54.6 54.9 55.3 55.5 
1976 55.6 55.8 55.9 56.1 56.5 56.8 57.1 57.4 57.6 57.9 58.0 58.2 
1977 58.5 59.1 59.5 60.0 60.3 60.7 61.0 61.2 61.4 61.6 61.9 62.1 
1978 62.5 62.9 63.4 63.9 64.5 65.2 65.7 66.0 66.5 67.1 67.4 67.7 
1979 68.3 69.1 69.8 70.6 71.5 72.3 73.1 73.8 74.6 75.2 75.9 76.7 
1980 77.8 78.9 80.1 81.0 81.8 82.7 82.7 83.3 84.0 84.8 85.5 86.3 
1981 87.0 87.9 88.5 89.1 89.8 90.6 91.6 92.3 93.2 93.4 93.7 94.0 
1982 94.3 94.6 94.5 94.9 95.8 97.0 97.5 97.7 97.9 98.2 98.0 97.6 
1983 97.8 97.9 97.9 98.6 99.2 99.5 99.9 100.2 100.7 101.0 101.2 101.3 
1984 101.9 102.4 102.6 103.1 103.4 103.7 104.1 104.5 105.0 105.3 105.3 105.3 
1985 105.5 106.0 106.4 106.9 107.3 107.6 107.8 108.0 108.3 108.7 109.0 109.3 
1986 109.6 109.3 108.8 108.6 108.9 109.5 109.5 109.7 110.2 110.3 110.4 110.5 
1987 111.2 111.6 112.1 112.7 113.1 113.5 113.8 114.4 115.0 115.3 115.4 115.4 
1988 115.7 116.0 116.5 117.1 117.5 118.0 118.5 119.0 119.8 120.2 120.3 120.5 
1989 121.1 121.6 122.3 123.1 123.8 124.1 124.4 124.6 125.0 125.6 125.9 126.1 
 200. Consumer Price Index – All Urban Consumers: CUUR0000SA0, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov (last visited Nov. 19, 2015) (select the “All Urban 
Consumers (Current Series) Top Picks” hyperlink; then select the “U.S. All items, 
1982-84=100 - CUUR0000SA0” check box; then click the “retrieve data” 
hyperlink); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 152. 
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1990 127.4 128.0 128.7 128.9 129.2 129.9 130.4 131.6 132.7 133.5 133.8 133.8 
1991 134.6 134.8 135.0 135.2 135.6 136.0 136.2 136.6 137.2 137.4 137.8 137.9 
1992 138.1 138.6 139.3 139.5 139.7 140.2 140.5 140.9 141.3 141.8 142.0 141.9 
1993 142.6 143.1 143.6 144.0 144.2 144.4 144.4 144.8 145.1 145.7 145.8 145.8 
1994 146.2 146.7 147.2 147.4 147.5 148.0 148.4 149.0 149.4 149.5 149.7 149.7 
1995 150.3 150.9 151.4 151.9 152.2 152.5 152.5 152.9 153.2 153.7 153.6 153.5 
1996 154.4 154.9 155.7 156.3 156.6 156.7 157.0 157.3 157.8 158.3 158.6 158.6 
1997 159.1 159.6 160.0 160.2 160.1 160.3 160.5 160.8 161.2 161.6 161.5 161.3 
1998 161.6 161.9 162.2 162.5 162.8 163.0 163.2 163.4 163.6 164.0 164.0 163.9 
1999 164.3 164.5 165.0 166.2 166.2 166.2 166.7 167.1 167.9 168.2 168.3 168.3 
2000 168.8 169.8 171.2 171.3 171.5 172.4 172.8 172.8 173.7 174.0 174.1 174.0 
2001 175.1 175.8 176.2 176.9 177.7 178.0 177.5 177.5 178.3 177.7 177.4 176.7 
2002 177.1 177.8 178.8 179.8 179.8 179.9 180.1 180.7 181.0 181.3 181.3 180.9 
2003 181.7 183.1 184.2 183.8 183.5 183.7 183.9 184.6 185.2 185.0 184.5 184.3 
2004 185.2 186.2 187.4 188.0 189.1 189.7 189.4 189.5 189.9 190.9 191.0 190.3 
2005 190.7 191.8 193.3 194.6 194.4 194.5 195.4 196.4 198.8 199.2 197.6 196.8 





9 205.352 206.686 207.949 208.352 208.299 207.917 208.490 208.936 210.177 210.036 
2008 
211.08
0 211.693 213.528 214.823 216.632 218.815 219.964 219.086 218.783 216.573 212.425 210.228 
2009 
211.14
3 212.193 212.709 213.240 213.856 215.693 215.351 215.834 215.969 216.177 216.330 215.949 
2010 
216.6

























2 236.119 236.599 237.805 238.638 238.654 238.316 237.945 237.838   
 
 
II. The Mechanics of the Inflation Adjustment Act 
 
A.  The “Inflation Gap” 
 
Annually reported inflation data pose a formidable barrier to analysis. The 
expedient of assuming a constant rate of inflation radically simplifies analysis. 
The General Accounting Office’s 2003 study of the Inflation Adjustment Act es-
timated that CPI historically increased by an annual average of 2.5%.201 This Ar-
ticle adopts that estimate. Unless indicated otherwise, the variable 
 
p , repre-
senting average annual inflation, in this Mathematical Appendix (and elsewhere 
 201. See 2003 GAO Report, supra note 14, at 10. 
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in this Article) may be interpreted without loss of generality as the constant 
0.025. 
The magnitude of any initial inflation gap may be expressed through the 
following equations: 
 
Initial inflation gap = 
 
(1+ p )n −1.1 
 
where n equals (b − a), the number of years that have elapsed before adjust-
ment. 
The amount of the inflation gap for a particular penalty is the value of the 
unadjusted penalty times the initial inflation gap: 
 
Amount of the inflation gap for a particular penalty = 
 
p ⋅[(1+ p )n −1.1]  
 
where p represents the original, unadjusted civil monetary penalty. 
As time passes, the Inflation Adjustment Act prevents closure of the infla-
tion gap. The gap created by the 1996 amendment’s 10% cap, expressed as the 
ratio of accumulated inflation to 10%, does remain constant. But the absolute 
amount will grow: 
 
Absolute inflation gap over time 
 
= p ⋅[(1+ p )n −1.1] ⋅ (1+ p )g  
 
where g represents the number of subsequent years after the initial adjustment 
over which inflation grows. 
To restate this relationship in more general (and more realistic) terms, we 
should (1) relax the assumption that future inflation will equal past inflation 
and (2) allow inflation, whether past and future, to fluctuate on an annual basis: 
 
Absolute inflation gap over time  = 
  
B. CPI Lag 
 
The CPI lag created by the Inflation Adjustment Act lends itself to formal 
mathematical description. The cost-of-living adjustment prescribed by section 
5(b) of the Inflation Adjustment Act may be formally expressed by the following 
formulas202: 
 










where b represents the later year and a represents the original year by which the 
cost-of-living adjustment is to be computed. 
 202. Inflation Adjustment Act § 5(b). 
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Section 5(b)(1)’s requirement that agencies consult CPI “for the month of 
June of the calendar year preceding [an inflation] adjustment” commits agencies 
to ignore the most recent year of inflation every time they adjust a civil mone-
tary penalty for inflation.203 Each round of adjustments under the Act therefore 
introduces an additional error, equivalent in magnitude to the most recent 
June-to-June change in CPI: 
 




≈ 1+ p ≈ 1.025 
 
Over multiple iterations, CPI lag compounds and can become quite con-
siderable. For a prospective period of g years, subsequent to an initial adjust-
ment, during which an agency expects to adjust penalties for inflation at a fre-
quency of once every f years, the cumulative lag can be predicted with the 
following equation: 
 
Cumulative CPI lag 
 






  −1 
 
where the partial brackets indicate the floor, or “greatest integer,” function, 
which is the largest integer which is less than or equal to g/f.204 
The inflation gap and cumulative CPI lag compound each other. Assuming 
that annual inflation changes by a constant amount enables us to use a simple, 
parametric expression for the combined effect of the inflation gap and cumula-










   
 
By relaxing the assumption that future inflation will equal past inflation, we 





















  The Inflation Adjustment Act’s rounding provisions follow a predictable 
pattern. The relationship between (1) changes in inflation that would trigger an 
 203. Id. § 5(b)(1). 
 204. See sources cited supra note 112. 
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increase and (2) the amounts by which an adjusted penalty must be adjusted 
may be expressed as a constant ratio: five-elevenths, or approximately 45.5%. 
The ratio between $5 and $11, between $50 and $110, and between $500 and 
$1,100, in each instance, is 5/11, or approximately 45.5%. The foregoing sentences 
express a simple mathematical relationship: 1.1 times 5/11 (roughly 45.5%) equals 
0.5, since . The following inequality expresses this relationship 
in formal fashion: 
 
 




Once this 45.5% increase in inflation triggers an adjustment, the Act’s 
rounding provisions force what would have been an already substantial 45.5% 
increase to be implemented, in whiplash-like fashion, as a 90.9% increase. As 
discussed in section IV.C. of this Article, the Pension and Welfare Benefits Ad-
ministration (PWBA) faced this issue. The PWBA, if faithfully complying with 
the Inflation Adjustment Act, would not raise its penalties from $11, $110, and 
$1,100 by 45.5% to $16, $160, and $1,600, but rather by 90.9% from $11, $110, and 
$1,100 to $21, $210, and $2,100: 
 
 
′ p ≥ 1.1p + 2 ⋅ 511 ⋅1.1p







Having raised the penalty from 1.1p to 2.1p, the rounding provisions dictate 
that the next round of PWBA adjustments take place when the cost-of-living 
adjustment factor reaches 2.1+0.5, or 2.6. The number of years, represented in 
the following equation by the variable t, that must elapse can be calculated thus: 
 
 
(1+ p ) t ≥ 2.62.1
1.025t ≥ 2.62.1
t ln(1.025) ≥ ln(2.62.1)





where the inverted partial brackets indicate the ceiling function, which is the 
smallest integer that is greater than or equal to t.205 The next integer greater 
than 8.65 is 9. Therefore, the next PWBA adjustment must take place in 9 years. 
 205. See sources cited supra note 112. 
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The foregoing analysis presupposes that inflation adjustments are not fur-
ther distorted by the CPI lag feature of the Inflation Adjustment Act. If CPI lag 
is taken into account, waiting periods (such as 17 or 9 years) should in all events 
be increased by an additional year. 
 
D. The Effect of a 10% Cap on Annual Inflation Adjustments 
 
As described in Part IV.C., the 2015 Act raised the cap on initial inflation 
adjustments from 10% to 150%.  This change addressed the “inflation gap” un-
der previous law.  A less radical reform would have consisted of converting the 
10% cap on initial inflation adjustments to a 10% cap on annual adjustments. 
 This expedient would have enabled the federal government to harmonize long-
dormant civil monetary penalties with contemporary economic conditions, 
without exposing private parties to the sudden shock of a massive increase. The 
effect of a 10% cap on annual increases can be projected mathematically. 
Let x = past years that have already “expired,” y = years in transition “yet” 
to come as we catch up with future inflation adjustments, 
 
p  = average past in-
flation rate (which we have consistently stipulated to be 2.5%), 
 
q  = average fu-
ture inflation rate (which may differ from 2.5%, but will be held at that level to 
simplify calculations) and m = maximum annual adjustment (presumably 10%): 
 
 
(1+ p )x ⋅ (1+ q )y = (1+ m)y
















 = x ln(1+ p )
y = x ln(1+ p )
ln(1+ m) − ln(1+ q )
 
 




q , and m, it is a reasonable shortcut to substitute 




q ), and ln(1+m). Formally: 
 
 
y ≈ x p 
m − q 
 
 




q , and m, respectively, as 2.5%, 2.5%, 




ln(1+ m) − ln(1+ q )
,  
 
may be approximated as 0.3497, or even more simply as 0.35, since: 
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on the reasoning that 
 
x ≈ ln(1+ x)  for small values of x, the multiplier is 1/3, or 
approximately 0.3333. In the end, these are very rough estimates, and the differ-
ence between 0.3333 and 0.3497 should not be dispositive. 
With either multiplier, a penalty that languished without adjustment for 
eleven years can be expected to catch up within four years, with no annual ad-
justment exceeding 10%. If x = 11, then y ≈ 11 · 0.35  or 11 · 0.33. By either multi-
plier, y < 4, since 11 · 0.35 ≈ 3.85 and 11 · 0.33 ≈ 3.63. 
   The foregoing analysis also demonstrates the backward “reach” of the 
2015 Act’s 150% cap on initial inflation adjustments.  Using the more elaborate 
exact formula for y and defining m as 1.5 (the equivalent of 150%), we can pre-
dict that the 150% gap allows initial inflation adjustments to capture as many as 
36 years of ignored inflation.  Defining y as 1 and solving for x should report the 
number of years of missed adjustments that can be captured by a single 150% 
adjustment: [ln(1+1.5) – ln(1.025)] / ln(1.025) ≈ 36.1079. 
 
qm
xy
−
≈
p
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